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ARTICLE
"KENNEWICK MAN" OR "ANCIENT ONE"? -
A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION
Maura A. Flood*
Our dead never forget the beautiful world that gave them
being.... At night, when the streets of your cities and villages are
silent and you think them deserted, they will throng with the
returning hosts that once filled and still love this beautiful land.1
INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 1996, two young men watching
hydroplane races from the banks of the Columbia River near
Kennewick, Washington, stumbled across what would turn out
to be one of the most complete and well-preserved set of ancient,
human skeletal remains ever discovered in this country.2 As
* Visiting Associate Professor of Law, University of Idaho College of Law.
1. Seattle, Chief of the Dwdmish and Suqudmish Tribes, in a speech at the
signing of the Treaty of Medicine Creek (Jan. 22, 1855) (transferring the aboriginal lands
of his and other tribes to the United States government).
2. Stang, John, Skull Found on Shore of Columbia, TRI-CITY HERALD
(Kennewick Washington), July 26, 1996, available at http://www.kennewick-
man.com/news/0729.html; See also, Stang, John, Tri-City Skeleton Dated at 9,000 Years
Old, TRI-CITY HERALD, August 28, 1996, available at http://www.kennewick-
man.com/news/0828.html; and Michael Parfit, The Dawn of Humans: Who Were the First
Americans, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC MAGAZINE, Dec. 2000 at 58-59; James C.
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soon as radiocarbon dating determined these remains to be
between 9,200 and 9,600 years old, legal wrangling over access
to them began.3 Scientists want to study and test the remains;
Native American tribes want to rebury the remains; and the
federal government wants to ensure that the remains are
treated in accordance with the Native American Graves
Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA). 4
The legal wrangling continues in Bonnichsen v. U.S., 5 an
action commenced by eight anthropologists seeking to study the
ancient remains. These plaintiffs, the news media, and most of
America know the remains by the name of "Kennewick Man," a
name based on the area in which the remains were discovered.6
They were so named by James Chatters, the anthropologist who
examined the remains for the local sheriff when they were first
discovered, and who announced that discovery to the world. 7
These remains also have another name, the name of "Ancient
One," which was conferred upon them by the tribes that have
claimed them.8
The authority to name something or someone is, and always
has been, a significant power.9 The act of naming the remains is
Chatters, Ancient Encounters: Kennewick Man and the First Americans, 55 (2001).
3. Id.
4. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013 (2001).
5. Bonnichsen v. United States, 969 F. Supp. 614 (D. Or. 1997) (hereinafter,
Bonnichsen v. U.S. or, simply, Bonnichsen).
6. See supra note 2.
7. Stang, John, Tri-City Skeleton Dated at 9,000 Years Old, TRI-CITY HERALD,
August 28, 1996, available at http://www.kennewick-man.com/news/0828.htm; James C.
Chatters, Ancient Encounters: Kennewick Man and the First Americans, 55 (2001); The
custom and practice among scientists is that the one who makes a discovery has the
right to give it a name. See, e.g., DAVID HURST THOMAS, SKULL WARS: KENNEWICK MAN,
ARCHAEOLOGY, AND THE BATTLE FOR NATIVE AMERICAN IDENTITY, xli (2nd ed. 2001); See
also, Roger Downey, Riddle of the Bones: Politics, Science, Race and the Story of
Kennewick Man at 7-14 (2000).
8. The tribes have chosen to refer to the remains as Oytpamanatityt, which
translates into English as "the Ancient One." Native American Graves Protection and
Repatriations Act: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Indian Affairs, 106th Cong. at 3
(2000) (Statement of Armand Minthorn of the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla
Indian Reservation); See also, SKULL WARS, supra, note 7, at xli.
9. The Book of Genesis, for example, recites that God gave Adam dominion over
all creatures, including, specifically, the power to name them (Genesis 2:18). England
anglicized all Gaelic names after conquering the peoples of Ireland, Scotland and Wales;
Spain imposed Spanish names on the peoples it found already residing in the Americas;
and the United States required Indians to take on English names in order to qualify for
land allotments and other benefits. See also, SKULL WARS, supra, note 7, at xl. Horace
Axtell, a Nez Perce Elder, explains that his family got the name Axtell when his
grandfather tried to register for an allotment of land from the federal government and
was told he had to have an English name. "He started to leave, saying 'Well, I gotta go
2
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an exercise of such power, an assertion of the right to claim such
power. These opposing claims of the scientists and the tribes
are grounded in fundamental beliefs: on the one hand, a belief in
the supreme importance of scientific knowledge and
investigation; on the other hand, a belief in the supreme
importance of cultural history, practices and values. The
scientists believe that Kennewick Man may reveal information
about the development of mankind and the peopling of the
Americas, and that this information may be lost forever if the
remains are not made available for extensive study and
testing. 10 The tribes believe that the remains of the Ancient One
must be treated with respect, that testing of the bones is a
desecration, that the spiritual journey of the Ancient One has
been disrupted by his removal from the earth, and that he must
be reburied as soon as possible." These contrasting beliefs of
the scientists and the tribes are so diametrically opposed as to
have no common ground between them. 12
The battle over these fragile, ancient bones has given rise to
several significant issues, relating to constitutional rights,
administrative law, the meaning of NAGPRA, and the unique
relationship between the federal government and American
Indian tribes. The focus of this article is the meaning and import
find a name.'" The secretary in the government office stopped him and told him he could
use her last name. "Her name was Axtell. That's where we got the name Axtell."
HORACE P. AXTELL & MARGO ARAGON, A LITTLE BIT OF WISDOM: CONVERSATIONS WITH
A NEZ PERCE ELDER, 2-3 (1997).
10. Plaintiffs'Amended Complaint, Bonnichsen v. U.S., supra note 5, at paragraph
32, page 10. (This amended complaint was filed on January 2, 2001 and is Document
#372 in the records of the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon in the
Bonnichsen case; a copy is on file with the author.)
11. Armand Minthorn, "Human Remains Should Be Reburied," position paper
dated Sept. 1996, available at http//www.umatilla.nsn.us/kennman.html (last visited on
12/18/01).
12. Some have characterized the Bonnichsen case as a collision between science
and religion. See, e.g., DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY: THE USE AND MISUSE OF
SCIENCE IN THE LAW, 177 (1999)(2nd ed. 2000). It might be more accurate to characterize
it as a collision between two religions. "Science has been called 'the American faith.'...
Many Americans with little understanding of science unquestioningly accept both its
process and its products. This faith in science has permeated American society since the
colonial era, shaping our culture as well as our social and governmental institutions."
Holly Doremus, Listing Decisions Under the Endangered Species Act: Why Better Science
Isn't Always Better Policy, 75 WASH. U.L.Q. 1029 (1997)(possibly add a parenthetical
here). Antone Minthorn, Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Umatilla, asserts: "It
is not science versus religion,. . . it is science versus law." Antone Minthorn, Kennewick
Man Issue Damages Relationships, Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian
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of NAGPRA, which can be fully appreciated only through
thorough scrutiny and interpretation. This statute is facing its
first significant court challenge - its first opportunity for full
interpretation - in Bonnichsen v. U.S. The court's
interpretation of NAGPRA will be the key to the resolution of
this case and, undoubtedly, of other cases yet to come. For this
reason, the "dynamic"' 3 or comprehensive method of statutory
interpretation should be used, because it will lead to the most
honest and accurate interpretation of NAGPRA.
According to federal Magistrate Judge John Jelderks, who
presides over Bonnichsen v. U.S., "the threshold issue" in the
case is whether the ancient remains found in Kennewick are
"Native American" within the meaning of NAGPRA. 14 That is
the pivotal question: are these prehistoric remains "Native
American" and therefore subject to the mandates of NAGPRA?
And, if they are, the next crucial inquiry becomes: Have the
claimant tribes established a "cultural affiliation" with the
remains pursuant to NAGPRA, so as to entitle them to
possession of the remains?
This article reviews the factual and legal context of
Bonnichsen v. U.S. It examines the aims, reasoning, and
effectiveness of several canons and theories of statutory
construction, as a necessary prelude to the work of interpreting
NAGPRA. The statute is then interpreted and explicated with
the assistance of those canons and theories, and with particular
focus on the statutory terms, "Native American" and "cultural
affiliation." This interpretation leads to the conclusions that
Ancient One/Kennewick Man is "Native American" within the
meaning of NAGPRA, and that the claimant tribes have
established the requisite "cultural affiliation" to entitle them to
ownership of these ancient remains.
In order to conduct a comprehensive interpretation of
NAGPRA, it is first necessary to examine the language of the
13. WILLiAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIc STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994).
Professor Eskridge describes this dynamic process of interpretation:
Just as the changing factual contexts for interpretation render it dynamic....
so the independent and changing nature of the interpreter ensures dynamic
interpretation .... The interpreter's role involves selection and creativity,
which is influenced, often unconsciously, by the interpreter's own frame of
reference - assumptions and beliefs about society, values and the statute itself.
Id. at 58.
14. Author's personal notes from observation of arguments in court on June 19,
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statute, in light of the relevant canons and theories of statutory
construction. In addition, it is necessary to read congressional
committee reports and hearing transcripts; research legal
precedent; and become familiar with the historical and social
circumstances that prompted enactment of the statute. Every
bit of this effort is essential to a complete and accurate
understanding of NAGPRA. Judges should have no less an
understanding when they construe and apply this or any other
federal statute, and thereby affect the lives not only of the
litigants in the controversy before them, but of much of
American society as well. This article suggests that it is
incumbent upon judges, when faced with an unclear or
ambiguous federal statute, to engage in rigorous, "dynamic," 15
comprehensive construction of that statute.
The process of statutory interpretation is equal in
importance to its product. That product, a statute whose
meaning has been comprehensively construed in the context of
an actual controversy, can best be appreciated through
participation in the process that led to it. This article is
intended to replicate that process, that "comprehensive
construction" of a statute, with all of its twists, turns and
crossroads. Accordingly, significant attention will be given to
the canons and theories of construction, and the traditional
methods used in interpreting statutes, before those canons,
theories and methods are applied to the interpretation of
NAGPRA.
BONNICHSEN V. U.S. - BACKGROUND, PROCEEDINGS AND STATUS
The anthropologists are busy, indeed, and ready to transport us
back into the savage forest where all human things . . . have
their beginnings; but the seed never explains the flower. 16
The Ancient One17 was discovered on federal property under
the control of the Army Corps of Engineers (the "Corps"),
property the United States purchased from the Walla Walla,
15. ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 13.
16. EDITH HAMILTON, THE GREEK WAY (1943).
17. In light of this article's conclusion that the remains are Native American
within the meaning of NAGPRA and that the claimant tribes have established a
"cultural affiliation" with the remains, these tribes clearly have the superior right to
name the remains. Accordingly, hereinafter the remains will be referred to solely by the
name of Ancient One.
5
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Cayuse and Umatilla Indian tribes in 1855.18 Due to the age of
the remains, the Corps gave notice of the discovery to the
Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation
("Umatilla") and other local tribes. NAGPRA requires, among
other things, that all Native American human remains
discovered on federal property must be repatriated to the
appropriate Indian tribe, in accordance with the provisions of
the statute and its implementing regulations. 19 Five American
Indian tribes, each having a history of residing upon or using
the land on which these remains were discovered, subsequently
joined together to submit a claim for repatriation of the
remains. 20  These claimant tribes are the Umatilla, the
Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation ("Colville"), the
Nez Perce Tribe of Idaho, the Wanapum, and the Confederated
Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation ("Yakama"). 21
The Corps, and subsequently the U.S. Department of the
Interior (the "DOI"), determined that the remains found in
Kennewick are "Native American" within the meaning of
NAGPRA, that a "cultural affiliation" exists between the
remains and the claimant tribes, and that, accordingly, the
remains must be repatriated to those tribes. 22 A group of
anthropologists commenced a federal court action to challenge
the government's determinations and to oppose the
repatriation 23 of the remains to the tribes.24 If the Bonnichsen
18. 'Treaty Between the United States and the WallaWalla, Cayuse, and Umatilla
Tribes and Bands of Indians in Washington and Oregon Territories, June 9, 1855
(ratified March 8, 1859), reprinted in 2 Indian Affairs: Laws & Treaties, Vol. 11,694-698
(Charles J. Kappler, ed., Washington, D.C. Government Printing Office)(1904). Pursuant
to this treaty, these several bands and tribes were moved to a single reservation, and
were thenceforth identified by the federal government as the "Confederated Tribes of the
Umatilla Indian Reservation".
19. 25 U.S.C. §3005 (2001).
20. Bonnichsen v. U.S., 969 F. Supp. 614, 618 (D. Or. 1997).
21. The Yakama were formerly known as the Yakima. The tribe is referred to by
either spelling throughout the documents in the Bonnichsen case. The spelling (or
misspelling), "Yakima," was used by the federal government in its 1855 treaty with this
tribe and has survived as a correct spelling for the name of the tribe.
22. See, Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate
and in Support of Agency Decisionmaking, Document #439 in the Bonnichsen record;
also available at www.kennewick-man.com/documents/fedbrief.html.
23. The use of the word "repatriation" in this statute is noteworthy. This word is a
rarity in American legislation. It is more commonly found in international law. Its
ordinary meaning is 'to bring or send back (a person, esp. a prisoner of war, a refugee,
etc.) to his country or the land of his citizenship." RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1966.) In NAGPRA, 'repatriation" refers to the process by which
native human remains and cultural articles are to be identified, claimed, and returned to
native groups. The statute does not separately define this term, however, which means
Vol. 63
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plaintiffs prevail, they will have an opportunity to secure access
to the remains for the purpose of conducting extensive studies
and tests. If the defendant United States prevails, the
determinations of the Corps and DOI will be upheld, and the
remains will be repatriated to the claimant tribes for reburial in
accordance with tribal traditions.
In September 1996, two months after the remains of the
Ancient One were discovered, the Corps published notice of its
intent to repatriate the remains to the claimant tribes. 25
Bonnichsen v. U.S. was the response to that notice.26 The
plaintiffs sought a restraining order to prevent the repatriation,
and "demanded a detailed scientific study to determine the
origins of the man before the Corps decided whether to
repatriate the remains." 27 In addition, the plaintiffs alleged that
they have a First Amendment right to study the remains; that
NAGPRA is unconstitutional because it promotes Native
American religion;28 and that their civil rights have been
violated by the Corps.29
The defendants, who include the Corps and several named
Corps employees, moved promptly for dismissal on several
grounds, including failure to exhaust administrative remedies
and failure to state a claim. 30 Judge Jelderks granted that
motion in part, dismissing the civil rights claims, but also
denied it in part, finding that plaintiffs' other claims were
legally sufficient and that the matter was ripe for adjudication.31
that its ordinary definition is operative. I believe the various implications and
ramifications attendant upon the use of this single word are, potentially, of great
importance, and should be thoroughly examined. Such examination, however, is outside
the scope of this article.
24. Bonnichsen v. U.S,969 F. Supp. 614 (D. Or. 1997). The decision to repatriate
in this instance is a recognition of tribal ownership of the remains, pursuant to Section
3002 of N.A.G.P.R.A.
25. Id. at 618.
26. The plaintiffs are: Robson Bonnichsen, C. Loring Brace, George W. Gill, C.
Vance Haynes, Richard L. Jantz, Douglas W. Owsley, Dennis J. Stanford, and D. Gentry
Steele. Owsley and Stanford are affiliated with the Smithsonian Institute; the others are
university professors. In addition, Bonnichsen is the director of the Center for the Study
of the First Americans, in Portland, Oregon. See, Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, supra
note 10.
27. See Bonnichsen, supra note 24, at 618.
28. See Plaintiffs'Amended Complaint, supra note 10, at 13.
29. See Bonnichsen, supra note 24, at 625.
30. See Bonnichsen, supra note 24, at 619.
31. See Bonnichsen, supra note 24. Included in the motion for dismissal, and in the
judge's decision, was a companion lawsuit brought by a religious group, the Asatru Folk
Assembly, to prevent repatriation of the remains to the tribes (Civ. Action No. 96-1481-
7
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Following that decision, the Corps withdrew its previous notice
of intent to repatriate the remains, and announced that it would
reconsider the evidence of cultural affiliation between the
remains and the claimant tribes.32 The Nez Perce and Umatilla
tribes then filed briefs in this case, as amicus curiae.33
In June of 1997, despite the Corps' withdrawal of its prior
determinations, Judge Jelderks vacated those determinations. 34
The judge explained his action as follows:
A change of activity by the defendant under the threat of judicial
scrutiny is insufficient to negate the existence of an otherwise ripe
case or controversy.... I conclude that this action has not been
mooted... The dispute here concerns a tangible object, whose
custody remains in dispute, and also the rights of various parties
to study (or to forbid the study) of that object.... Nor am I
persuaded that the Corps has entirely abandoned its earlier
decision and is now objectively considering the evidence and the
law without any preconceived notions concerning the outcome. 35
Judge Jelderks remanded for. reconsideration of the
statutory meaning of "Native American" and "cultural
affiliation," and of whether NAGPRA applies to these particular
remains. He also provided the Corps with a list of specific
questions, and directed the Corps to answer those questions
during its reconsideration of this matter.36 Those questions
included the following:
1. Whether these remains are subject to NAGPRA, and why (or
why not);
2. What is meant by terms such as 'Native American' and
'indigenous' in the context of NAGPRA and the facts of this
case;
3. . . .
4. Whether NAGPRA requires (either expressly or implicitly) a
JE). The Asatru practice a pre-Christian religion that originated in northern and
eastern Europe. They claimed Kennewick Man/Ancient One as an ancient member of
their religion, following news reports that he exhibits "caucasoid" features. The Asatru
have not filed an amended complaint, and did not appear to present arguments in court
on June 19-20, 2001. For these reasons, they are excluded from the focus of this article.
32. Bonnichsen v. U.S., 969 F. Supp. 628, 637-638 (D. Or. 1997).
33. Id. at 632.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 640-41.
36. Id. at 632, 651-54.
Vol. 63
8
Montana Law Review, Vol. 63 [2002], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol63/iss1/2
2002 "KENNEWICK MAN" OR "ANCIENT ONE"
biological connection between the remains and a contemporary
Native American tribe;
5. Whether there has to be any cultural affiliation between the
remains and a contemporary Native American tribe...;
6. The level of certainty required to establish such a biological or
cultural affiliation, e.g., possible, probable, clear and
convincing, etc. 37
Finally, the judge stayed the proceedings, retained
jurisdiction, denied plaintiffs' motion for an order permitting
them to study the remains, and ordered the Corps to retain
custody of the remains.38
The Corps, pursuant to the provisions of NAGPRA, 39
requested that DOI take responsibility for making the requisite
determinations concerning the Ancient One, and DOI consented
to do so. 40 Once it agreed to lead agency status, DOI set about
the business of answering Judge Jelderks' questions. It
authorized additional study and testing of the remains in order
to resolve the issues of "cultural affiliation" and "Native
American" status. This testing was extensive and invasive; it
included the pulverization of bone for the purpose of extracting
DNA. 41 It was carried out despite vigorous opposition from the
claimant tribes.4 2 Many of the tests were done at the urging of
the plaintiffs, and by experts recommended by the plaintiffs.
43
37. Id. at 651-52.
38. Bonnichsen, supra note 32, at 632.
39. 25 U.S.C. § 3002(d)(3) (2000): "If the Secretary of the Interior consents, the
responsibilities (in whole or in part) under paragraphs (1) and (2) of the.., head of any
other agency or instrumentality may be delegated to the Secretary .... "
40. Interagency Agreement, signed March 24, 1998. A copy is on file with the
author; also available at http://www.cr.nps.gov/aad/kennewick/agree.htm. NOTE: As of
12/05/01, access to DOI documents has been been severly restricted by a federal court
order intended to protect Indian trust data. All documents cited herein as available at cr
nps [Cultural Resources, National Park Service] are not presently accessible, and will
not be accessible until the DOI can certify that they contain no data on individual Indian
trusts.
41. Bone samples are taken from the remains, then bone is pulverized into a
powder for purposes of attempting to extract mitochondrial DNA. See DNA Analysis
Reports, copies on file with author, also available at
www.cr.nps.gov/aad/kennewick/merriwether-cabana.htm and
www.cr.nps.gov/aad/kennewick/kaestle.htm. In addition, five carbon-dating tests, which
also require pulverization of the bone, were conducted on these remains. See, letter of
Francis P. McManamon, DOI Consulting Archaeologist, dated Jan. 11, 2000, available at
http://www.cr.nps.gov/aad/nagpra/kennew.htm.
42. Statements made by counsel to the amicus tribes and counsel to the U.S., in
personal court notes.
43. See, Defendants' Memorandum, supra note 22.
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As it turned out, DNA could not be extracted in a sufficient
amount to allow accurate testing, due to the mineralized
condition of the bones.44  However, a great deal of other
information was gathered and examined, 45 including the
following:
The Kennewick remains represent a single individual who most
probably was interred rather than left to decompose on the
surface. ... Like other early American skeletons, the Kennewick
remains exhibit a number of morphologicalfeatures that are not
found in modern populations.... The most
craniometricallysimilar samples appeared to be those from the
South Pacific and Polynesia, as well as the Ainu of Japan, a
pattern observed in other studies of early American crania in
North and South America ... Kennewick is clearly not a
Caucasoid. 46
In January 2000, DOI concluded that the remains known as
Ancient One are "Native American" within the meaning of
NAGPRA.47 The statutory definition of Native American is
contained in Section 3001(9) of NAGPRA:
Native American' means of, or relating to, a tribe, people, or
culture that is indigenous to the United States.
DOI's determination "was based upon chronological
information supplied by the radiocarbon analysis of bone
samples and previously conducted scientific examinations."48
Those examinations included physical investigation of the bones,
study of the lithic spear point, and investigation of the area in
44. See, DNA Analysis Reports, supra note 41.
45. The various scientific reports are available at www.cr.nps/gov/aad/kennewick.
Most of these reports are extremely technical, but some of the information is
comprehensible even to non-scientists. Two bits of useful information are: (1) the
Ancient One is thousands of years older than any of the specimens with which he was
compared; and (2) all conclusions about which "race" he most closely resembles are based
on probabilities, and those probabilities are based on scientific theories (i.e., enlightened
guesses) about how humans developed over time.
46. Joseph F. Powell and Jerome C. Rose, "Report on the Osteological Assessment
of the 'Kennewick Man' Skeleton," copy on file with the author (also available at
http://www.cr.nps.gov/aad/kennewick/powell-rose.htm.)
47. See page 1 of Secretary Babbitt's announcement letter available at
http://www.cr.nps.gov/aad/kennewick/babb-letter.htm. The Secretary confirmed this
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which the remains were discovered. The remaining issue to be
addressed was that of the appropriate disposition of the Ancient
One. NAGPRA requires, in connection with inadvertent
discoveries, that ownership of claimed cultural items49 shall be
established in accordance with Section 3002(a). That section
provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 50
(a) The ownership or control of Native American cultural items which
are excavated or discovered on Federal or tribal lands after
November 16, 1990, shall be (with priority given in the order
listed) -
(1) in the case of Native American human remains and associated
funerary objects, in the lineal descendants of the Native American;
or
(2) in any case in which such lineal descendants cannot be
ascertained,...
(A) in the Indian tribe... on whose tribal land such
objects or remains were discovered;
(B) in the Indian tribe ... which has the closest cultural
affiliation with such remains.. .and which, upon notice,
states a claim for such remains . . .; or
(C) if the cultural affiliation of the objects cannot be
reasonably ascertained and if the objects were discovered on
Federal land that is recognized by a final judgment of the
Indian Claims Commission or the United States Court of
Claims as the aboriginal land of some Indian tribe -
(2) in the Indian tribe that is recognized as aboriginally
occupying the area in which the objects were
discovered, if upon notice, such tribe states a claim for
such remains or objects ...
Due to the age of these remains, DOI concluded that no
direct lineal descendants exist.51  The remains were not
discovered on "tribal land," because that term refers only to land
within reservations and dependent Indian communities. 52 Nor
is there a U.S. Court of Claims or an Indian Claims Commission
"final judgment" recognizing the site where the remains were
49. "Cultural items" is a defined term that includes human remains. 25 U.S.C. §
3001(3) (2000).
50. 25 U.S.C. § 3002(a) (2000)(emphasis supplied).
51. Babbitt letter, supra note 47, at pages 3-4. See also, Defendants'
Memorandum, supra note 22.
52. 25 U.S.C. § 3001(15) (2000).
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found as the aboriginal land of one particular tribe. 53 Therefore,
the focus of DOI's investigation had to be whether a cultural
affiliation exists between the remains and the claimant tribes,
pursuant to subsection 1 of Section 3002(a)(2)(C). NAGPRA
defines "cultural affiliation" as follows:
'Cultural affiliation' means that there is a relationship of shared
group identity which can be reasonably traced historically or
prehistorically between a present day Indian tribe or Native
Hawaiian organization and an identifiable earlier group. 54
The statute does not specify a requisite standard of proof for
establishing cultural affiliation in order to determine ownership
of inadvertently discovered remains. However, subsection 2 of
§3002(2)(C) provides that, in the event of competing claims
submitted by different tribes, the tribe which shows "by a
preponderance of the evidence" that it has a "stronger cultural
relationship with the remains" is the tribe in whom ownership
shall vest. A preponderance of the evidence standard is also
specified in §3005(a)(4), which governs repatriation of remains
in the possession of museums or federal agencies at the time of
NAGPRA's enactment. In addition, that section lists relevant
evidence to be considered on the issue of cultural affiliation as:
"geographical, kinship, biological, archaeological,
anthropological, linguistic, folkloric, oral traditional, historical,
or other relevant information or expert opinion."55
The regulations pertinent to DOI's handling of the issues
concerning the Ancient One include 43 CFR Sections 10.6 and
10.14.56 These regulations mirror the language of NAGPRA
Section 3002, with only slight variation. Section 10.6 provides
53. Babbitt letter, supra note 47, at 3-4. There is, however, a settlement
agreement of an Indian Claims Commission case pertaining to this land, which includes
findings of fact that recognize this area as land utilized by all the tribes that have joined
in the N.A.G.P.R.A. claim for the Ancient One. That is not, however, a "final judgment"
delineating aboriginal land boundaries, so it does not necessarily have preclusive effect
under N.A.G.P.R.A. § 3002(15). The Secretary gave consideration to the settlement
agreement, as evidence of aboriginal occupation of this land, but did not deem it
determinative on the disposition issue. Id. See also, Defendants' Memorandum, supra
note 43.
54. 25 U.S.C. § 3001(15) (2000).
55. See supra note 40. 25 U.S.C. § 3005(a)(4) (2001). This section refers only to
repatriation of remains and other cultural articles already in the possession of museums
and federal agencies. However, it offers guidance to the Secretary of the Interior on the
types of evidence Congress deemed acceptable and relevant on the subject of cultural
affiliation.
56. 56 C.F.R. §§ 10.6 and 10.14 (2001).
Vol. 63
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that human remains that have not been claimed by lineal
descendants and were not found on tribal lands, shall belong to
"the Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization that has the
closest cultural affiliation with the human remains. . . , as
determined pursuant to §10.14(c)." Section 10.14 provides, in
relevant part, as follows:
(c)(3) ... Evidence [of shared group identity] ... must
establish that a present-day Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian
organization has been identified from prehistoric or historic times
to the present as descending from the earlier group.
(d) A finding of cultural affiliation should be based upon
an overall evaluation of the totality of the circumstances and
evidence pertaining to the connection between the claimant and
the material being claimed and should not be precluded solely
because of some gaps in the record.
(e) Evidence. Evidence of a kin or cultural affiliation
between a present-day individual, Indian tribe, or Native
Hawaiian organization and human remains .... must be
established by using the following types of evidence:
Geographical, kinship, biological, archeological,
anthropological, linguistic, folklore, oral tradition, historical, or
other relevant information or expert opinion.
(f) Standard of Proof. ... Claimants do not have to
establish cultural affiliation with scientific certainty. 57
In September 2000, after considering all the evidence
gathered, which comprises approximately 25,000 pages of
material,58  DOI concluded: "that the evidence of cultural
continuity is sufficient to show by a preponderance of the
evidence that the Kennewick remains are culturally affiliated
with the present-day Indian claimants." 9 The evidence that
established a sufficient nexus between the tribes and the
Ancient One was: "The oral tradition, folklore, traditional
history and geographic evidence .. ,, 60 The "geographic
57. Id. § 10.14.
58. This enormous administrative record includes scientific and anthropological
data and reports, expert opinion, information submitted by the plaintiffs, and also oral
history and cultural evidence submitted by the tribes. It is assembled into more than 50
volumes of documents, which volumes are on file in the Bonnichsen court records as
Documents 310 through 366.
59. Babbitt letter, supra note 47, at page 6.
60. Defendants' Memorandum, supra, note 22, at page 11. See also, Babbitt letter,
supra note 47, at 5-7. DOI considered the Indian Claims Commission cases as evidence
of aboriginal occupation. It explained its reliance on this evidence as follows:
[D]isposition under §3002(a)(2)(C)(1) may not be precluded when an ICC
13
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evidence" included evidence that all of the claimant tribes had
lived on or used the land where the Ancient One was discovered.
On the basis of the determination of cultural affiliation, the
Secretary directed that the remains be repatriated to the
claimant tribes.61
The plaintiffs in Bonnichsen v. U.S. filed an amended
complaint, and moved to have DOI's disposition decision
vacated. 62 Presiding Judge John Jelderks heard arguments for
and against that motion on June 19 and 20, in the federal
district courthouse in Portland, Oregon. In addition to hearing
the arguments of counsel for the parties, Judge Jelderks allowed
counsel for each amicus party to present arguments as well.63
He also allowed the president of the Society for American
Archaeology, who attended the proceedings without legal
counsel, to make a statement concerning his organization's
position on the issues raised in this case. 64
During the proceedings, Judge Jelderks asked numerous
questions about the meaning and requirements of NAGPRA.
Several questions that he revisited throughout the full day of
argument on June 19th pertained to the statutory terms,
"Native American" and "cultural affiliation." This article has
taken its cue from the judge, and will focus on the meaning of
these terms in its examination and interpretation of the statute.
The various methods and means of interpreting statutes must
judgment did not specifically delineate aboriginal territory due to a voluntary
settlement agreement. If the ICC's findings of fact and opinions entered prior
to the compromise settlement clearly identified an area as being the joint or
exclusive territory of a tribe, this evidence is sufficient to establish aboriginal
occupation for purposes of §3002(a)(2)(C)(1)... The Federal land where the
Kennewick remains were found was the subject of several ICC cases brought
by the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Reservation... These cases
culminated in a final judgment in accordance with a compromise settlement.
Although the compromise settlement did not delineate the aboriginal territory
of the Umatilla, the ICC had previously determined in its opinion and findings
of fact that several Indian tribes, including the Umatilla (WallaWalla and
Cayuse) and Nez Perce, used and occupied this area where the Kennewick
remains were found.
Id. at 6-7.
61. Defendants' Memorandum, supra note 22, at Part IV(B).
62. The Amended Complaint also added DOI, its then-Secretary Bruce Babbitt,
and its consulting archaeologist, Francis McManamon, to the roster of defendants.
63. Personal court notes. Arguments were presented by legal counsel for the
Colville, Nez Perce, Umatilla, and Yakama tribes; and also by counsel for the National
Congress of American Indians.
64. Personal court notes. It was refreshing to observe Judge Jelderks' open
courtroom demeanor, and his willingness to let every party with some stake in the
proceeding have an opportunity to speak.
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be explored, before NAGPRA can be properly and fully
construed.
THEORIES AND METHODS OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
There are thousands of articles and books on the subject of
statutory interpretation, 65 most of them produced in the last
twenty years.66 These works promote several different theories
of interpretation, including Intentionalism, Purposivism, Public
Choice Theory, Positivism, Pragmatism, Realism, and
Textualism. They propose that the correct way to interpret
statutes is objective, subjective, hermeneutical, structuralist, or
even "post-structuralist." This theorizing and posturing has
reached fever pitch in the courts as well as the law journals,
resulting in several instances of dueling opinions issued by
Supreme Court justices on the subject of statutory
interpretation. 67
This state of affairs will inevitably affect the interpretation
of NAGPRA, as it wends its way through the federal courts, in
Bonnichsen and other matters yet to come. It is necessary,
therefore, to examine the various theories of interpretation and
canons of construction that remain popular among the judiciary
and the scholars, in order to make some sense of the
interpretation process before we attempt to make sense of
NAGPRA.
65. There is an extensive listing of these materials in Footnote 1 of 2A NORMAN J.
SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45:01 (West Group 6th ed. 2001).
Particularly interesting works include: REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND
APPLICATION OF STATUTES (Little, Brown & Co., 1975); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR.,
PHILIP P. FRICKEY AND ELIZABETH GARRETT, LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION (Foundation Press, 2000); POPKIN, STATUTES IN COURT: THE HISTORY
AND THEORY OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1999); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION (Princeton Univ. Press, 1997); and CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE
RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE (Harvard University
Press, 1990). Other books and articles on the subject of statutory interpretation are cited
throughout this article.
66. At the time of this article, a search for "statutory interpretation" (with no
additional modifiers) in the Westlaw "JLR" (Journals & Law Reviews Combined)
database produced 13,465 articles written after 1981, and 258 articles written in 1981
and earlier years (as of August 1, 2001).
67. See, e.g., PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Dep't of Ecology, 511
U.S. 700, 114 S.Ct. 1900 (1994); NASA v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 527 U.S.
229, 119 S.Ct. 1979 (1999); National Federation of Federal Employees, Local 1309 v.
Dep't of the Interior, 526 U.S. 86, 119 S.Ct. 1003 (1999); Johnson v. U.S., 529 U.S. 694,
120 S.Ct. 1795 (2000); Carter v. U.S., 530 U.S. 255, 120 S.Ct. 2159 (2000); and
Chickasaw Nation v. U.S., _ U.S. -_, 122 S.Ct. 528 (2001).
2002
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Constitutional Restraints on Statutory Interpretation
The Constitution imposes two clear constraints on the
process of statutory interpretation. First of all, it makes the
enactment of statutes the exclusive domain of Congress. 68
Secondly, a bill introduced in one of the houses of Congress can
become a statute, and thus the law of the land, only if it
progresses through the enactment and presidential signing
process required by Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution. 69 In
addition, there are two "constitutional assumptions" that have
traditionally affected statutory interpretation. 70 The first is that
Congress must comply with certain norms and expectancies in
communicating with its constituents. Simply put, Congress
must use ordinary English in all of its communications,
including statutes. The second assumption is that the
Constitution requires Congress to make its laws reasonably
available to the American people.71 In other words, laws cannot
be kept secret, but must be publicized and made accessible to all
persons who will be expected to comply with those laws.
The Basic Rules of Construction
The two most basic rules of statutory construction are
known as the "plain meaning rule" and the "golden rule." The
"plain meaning rule" holds that, when the meaning of a statute
is "plain," or clear and unambiguous, no further inquiry is
necessary. 72 The sole exception to this is the "golden rule" of
interpretation, which holds that the words of a statute must be
given their ordinary meanings, unless Congress has directed
otherwise or unless doing so would lead to an absurd or
incongruous result.73
Generally, the supposition is that a statute must be "plain"
or clear in meaning on the basis of the text alone. Some judges,
however, look beyond the text to determine whether the
68. U.S. Const. Art. I, § 1. See, REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND
APPLICATION OF STATUTES (Little, Brown & Co., 1975) 7; and WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR.,
DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 13.
69. DICKERSON, supra note 68, at 7.
70. Id. at 10.
71. Id. at 11.
72. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 7 n.4 (1980); 2A SINGER, supra note 65, at §
45:02.
73. SINGER, supra note 65, at § 45:12. Some refer to this as the "ordinary meaning
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statute's meaning is "plain" when viewed in light of its context. 74
Context may affect the "golden rule" as well, since the ordinary
meanings of words inevitably vary depending upon the context
in which they are used. Judges disagree over what context
consists of, and how much of it is relevant to statutory meaning.
This disagreement about context has created a sort of
"continental divide" between the two primary schools of thought
on statutory interpretation. On one side of the divide are those
who believe that the text of a statute is the primary indicator of
statutory meaning; on the other side are those who believe that
statutory meaning is affected by, and dependent upon, context.
There is only one theory of interpretation currently in
general use which regards the text as determinative of statutory
meaning. That theory is known, not surprisingly, as
Textualism. There are several different theories, however,
which advocate the importance of context, and these shall be
referred to collectively, for the sake of simplicity, as "contextual"
theories of interpretation. 75
Textualism
Whether the interpreter favors a textual or a contextual
approach, every exercise in statutory interpretation must begin
with an examination of the statute's text.76 Textualism 7 7 is a
74. "To determine the plain meaning of a statutory provision, we examine not only
the specific provision at issue, but also the structure of the statute as a whole, including
its object and policy." Children's Hosp. and Health Ctr. v. Belshe, 188 F.3d 1090, 1096
(9th Cir. 1999).
75. Some classify these two schools of thought as "objective" (text-oriented) and
'subjective" (context-oriented). The real difference, in practice, is "between disregarding
the legislative history and taking it into account." REED DICKERSON, THE
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES, supra note 68, at 83. Others
characterize the continental divide as being between "formalists," who believe in the
"determinacy" of the text, and "realists," who believe the text has no meaning until its
words are interpreted. KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND
LITERARY THEORY: SOME COMMON CONCERNS OF AN UNLIKELY PAr, in INTERPRETING
LAW AND LITERATURE - A HERMENEUTIC READER, 116 (Sanford Levinson and Steven
Mailloux eds., 1988).
76. Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 265 (1981); Demarest v. Manspeaker,498 U.S.
184, 187 (1991). "Though we may not end with the words in construing a disputed
statute, one certainly begins there." Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading
of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 535 (1947).
77. According to Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, a textualist is not wedded
to the literal meaning of a text, but rather is one who construes a statute "...
reasonably, to contain all that it fairly means." SCALIA, A MATER OF INTERPRETATION,
supra note 65, at 23. Scalia also makes the statement that "In textual interpretation,
context is everything." Id. at 37. The context he is referring to, however, is extremely
narrow, and often consists of little more than statute itself.
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theory that has been in use, though not necessarily in vogue,
since the late nineteenth century.78 When faced with the task of
interpreting a statute, most judges, including textualists, start
with the plain meaning rule and the golden rule, giving the
words of a statute their ordinary meanings.7 9 If the statute's
meaning cannot be gleaned from such a reading of the text, then
a textualist may consult a dictionary or dictionaries in order to
construe the language of the statute.80 A textualist does not look
to extrinsic sources, such as legislative history, for assistance in
determining the meaning of a statute.8' If necessary, however, a
textualist will rely on traditional canons of statutory
construction.8 2
Textualism posits that the goal of statutory interpretation is
the discernment of statutory meaning, and that the only
relevant sources of meaning are the text and text-related
materials.8 3 The presumption underlying Textualism is that the
use of extrinsic sources, such as congressional committee reports
and other legislative history, is not appropriate, for several
reasons. First, since those extrinsic materials have not gone
through the requisite process for the enactment of law, they are
not law, and cannot be regarded as official pronouncements of
law.8 4 Secondly, legislative history materials are not a reliable
source of information about legislative meaning, due to the self-
78. Jonathan R. Siegel, Textualism and Contextualism in Administrative Law, 78
B.U. L. REV. 1023, 1025 (1998); WILLIAM D. POPKIN, STATUTES IN COURT (Duke Univ.
Press, 199).
79. LIEF H. CARTER, REASON IN LAw 61 (Harper Collins, 1988). This emphasis on
ordinary meaning is in keeping with the "constitutional assumption" that Congress will
speak to its public in language that they can understand.
80. See SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 65, at 114; Ellen P.
April, The Law of the Word: Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme Court, 30 ARIZ. ST. L. J.
275 (1998); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Justice Breyer: Intentionalist, Pragmatist, and
Empiricist, 8 ADMIN. LAW. J. AM. U. 747, 747 (1995).
81. William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 621, 625
(1990). Eskridge calls the textualism espoused by Justice Scalia and others the "New
Textualism." The Textualism described in this article is really the "New Textualism"
practiced by Justice Scalia and others. The "old Textualism" was nothing but Literalism
with the addition of the "golden rule."
82. Siegel, Textualism and Contextualism in Administrative Law, 78 B.U. L. REV.
1023, 1043 (1998); See also, SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 65 at 34-
35.
83. ESKRIDGE, ET AL., supra, note 65, at 228.
84. Id. at 228-229; BREYER, supra note 58, at 862; and SCALIA, supra note 65, at
34-35. See also, John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L.
REV. 673, 675 (1997): "[Gyiving decisive weight to legislative history assigns dispositive
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serving nature of comments made in debates and colloquy, and
the sort of deal-making that is inherent in any congressional
vote.85 Thirdly, a court's use of extrinsic materials to assist it in
construing a statute would engage the court in legislative,
rather than judicial, activity, thereby violating the
Constitutional requirement of separation of powers.
8 6
Lastly, textualists opine that the use of extrinsic materials
in statutory construction is a disservice to the general public.
All persons who may be affected by a statute have a right to rely
on its apparent meaning, and the only source commonly
available to them is the statute itself.8 7 One who expressed this
position particularly eloquently is former Supreme Court Justice
Robert Jackson:
Moreover, there are practical reasons why we should accept
whenever possible the meaning which an enactment reveals on its
face. Laws are intended for all of our people to live by; and the
people go to law offices to learn what their rights are... Aside
from a few offices in the larger cities, the materials of legislative
history are not available to the lawyers who can afford neither the
cost of acquisition, cost of housing, nor the cost of repeatedly
examining the whole congressional history. To accept legislative
debates to modify statutory provisions is to make the law
inaccessible to a large part of the country. 88
Textualism's critics have succeeded in chipping away at all
four of its cornerstones. First of all, legislative history does not
have to be given conclusive effect, nor treated as the law of the
land, in order for it to provide valuable information relevant to a
statute's interpretation.8 9  An apparently clear statutory
meaning may be confirmed by reference to legislative history;
and a meaning that is ambiguous may be clarified by reference
to legislative history.90 Secondly, the fact that members of
85. SCALIA, supra note 65, at 32-34.
86. ESKRIDGE, ET AL., supra note 65, at 228-229: "Justice Scalia argues that the
new textualism... is also.., the methodology most consistent with the rule of law and
the separation of judicial from legislative powers in our system." See also SCALIA, supra
note 65, at 22.
87. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES, supra note
65, at 163 and 165.
88. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 396 (1951);
quoted in EUGENE C. GERHART, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JACKSON: LAWYER'S JUDGE
100 (1961).
89. Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65
S. CAL. L. REv. 845, 863 (1992).
90. Id. at 848-851; William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 U.C.L.A. L.
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Congress may make "deals" in order to get legislation passed is
not cause to discount legislative history entirely. Judges review
evidence of one sort or another in every case. They learn how to
separate the wheat from the chaff, the reliable from the
unreliable. Surely this skill is not lost to them when the
evidence they are considering relates to the legislative history of
a statute.91
The textualists' argument that the use of extrinsic sources
in statutory construction would turn judges into legislators is
spurious. The use of legislative history and other relevant
extrinsic materials need not differ from the use of any other sort
of interpretational aid, such as dictionaries and traditional
canons of construction.92 While judges are not and cannot be
legislators, they are and always have been makers of law. They
are Congress's partners, albeit junior partners, in the law-
making business. In addition, a court's use of legislative history
in order to clarify ambiguous statutory terms does not violate
the separation of powers mandate, but rather reinforces
Congress's superior law-making role. 93
The argument that legislative history materials are not
accessible to the public was once the most persuasive argument
against its use. This argument, however, is no longer
persuasive. 94 Legislative history materials, including committee
reports, congressional hearing transcripts, and earlier copies of
a bill, are readily available to the sole practitioner and to the
REV. 621, 622 (1993).
91. "Nor am I convinced that courts can ever do more than bring their generally
critical faculties to bear on the totality of evidence in the legislative record in the same
way that they deal with other complex evidentiary records." Patricia M. Wald, Some
Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOwA
L. REV. 195, 214 (1983). In my opinion, that is enough for them to do.
92. BREYER, supra note 89, at 870-873.
93. "The traditional notion is that legislative history/intent should be used to
interpret texts whose meaning cannot be conclusively determined from the text alone.
And, if the meaning of the statutory provision cannot be determined from the text alone,
the idea of trying to discern the intent of the enacting body would seem to further
democratic principles rather than undermine them." William L. Funk, Faith in Texts -
Justice Scalia's Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution: Apostasy for the Rest of
Us?" 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 825, 841-42 (1997).
94. According to Justice Stephen Breyer: "This argument overlooks the fact that
courts use history to interpret unclear statutes. The use of legislative history can
therefore make it easier, not more difficult, for the law-abiding citizen to plan conduct
according to law. Legislative history is not difficult to find ... Summaries are available
in most libraries and the federal government maintains depository libraries with full
texts of relevant documents." Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Statutory
Interpretation, supra note 89, at 869.
Vol. 63
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general public through the nation-wide system of federal
depository libraries and through on-line research services.95
Finally, if, as Textualism asserts, the ultimate goal of
interpretation is the discernment of meaning, then anything and
everything that could have bearing on that meaning ought to be
considered. 96
The Traditional Canons of Construction
Textualism does allow for some consideration of context, but
only a very narrow, text-based context. For example, a statutory
provision may be interpreted in relation to the rest of the statute
of which it constitutes a part;97 or an entire statute may be
construed in relation to other statutes, if it is connected with
them as part of a regulatory scheme.98 The use of traditional
canons of construction is also permissible under Textualism,
when a statute's meaning is not clear and dictionary definitions
do not suffice to make it so.99 These include text-based canons
that relate to usage and syntax, as well as substantive canons
that apply well-established principles of law or policy to clarify
the meaning of a disputed text.100
Two of the traditional text-based canons of construction are
noscitur a sociis, or, "it is known by its companions;"'u0 and
ejusdem generis, or, "of the same sort," which requires that a
term of general import be construed in light of more specific
95. Several web sites provide access to legislative history materials, free of charge.
Persons who do not have their own internet service may, in most locations, secure such
access at their local public library.
96. In the words of Felix Frankfurter, "If the purpose of construction is the
ascertainment of meaning, nothing that is logically relevant should be excluded." Some
Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 541 (1947).
97. William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as
Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 355 (1990). This is referred to as the "whole
statute" rule. See also, Watson, Liberal Construction of CERCLA, 20 HARv. ENvTL. L.
REV. 199, 224 (1996). The practice of interpreting a statute so as to ensure that all of its
provisions work together as an integral whole has also been called "intratextualism."
Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1999). Interpreting a
statutory provision as part of a "whole" may include ensuring that its construction does
not make another provision superfluous, or incongruous, and defining terms used in
more than one section of a statute in the same way.
98. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES, supra note
65, at 109. This practice of interpreting a statute in the context of related statutes is
referred to as construction in pari materia. Id.
99. SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 65, at 28.
100. Id.; Jonathan R. Siegel, Textualism and Contextualism in Administrative Law,
78 B.U. L. REV. 1023, 1043 (1998).
101. SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 65, at 26.
2002
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terms listed with it.102 For example, a state statute prohibiting
grave desecration might provide: "[N]o person shall willfully
vandalize, deface, mutilate, or otherwise harm any grave, grave
marker or grave contents." In accordance with noscitur a sociis
and ejusdem generis, the general term, "harm," should be
interpreted in light of the specific terms with which it is listed,
namely, the words "vandalize," "mutilate" and "deface".
Most judges, including textualists, have traditionally used
several substantive canons to assist them in construing
ambiguous or unclear statutes. 0 3 These include two canons that
are particularly relevant to the interpretation of NAGPRA. The
first of these is the "remedial purpose" canon, which suggests
that a remedial statute must be construed broadly so as to give
effect to its purpose. 10 4 The second is the "Indian law" canon.
This canon requires Indian treaties and legislation to be
construed in favor of Indian interests. 105 The Indian law canon
is "a judge-made rule responding to the inequitable treatment of
Indians by the nation in the past. ... In the face of that
history, and obvious disparities in bargaining power, courts give
Indian tribes the benefit of the doubt." 06 These substantive
canons have a long history of use in the federal courts. Because
these canons are so firmly established in judicial tradition and
precedent, even textualist judges are often willing to rely upon
them, despite the fact that they bring an "extra-textual" element
into the process of statutory interpretation.
There is one other "canon" of sorts that is germane to the
interpretation of NAGPRA. A reviewing court will defer to an
agency's interpretation of a statute, if the agency has been
authorized by Congress to implement and administer that
statute. The level of deference due will depend upon several
102. Id.; also, SUNSTEIN, supra note 65, at 151 (discussing all three of these
"syntactical" canons or "norms" of interpretation).
103. But, see SCALIA, supra note 65, at 28-29. Justice Scalia is not a big fan of the
substantive canons. He grudgingly admits, however, that some of them make a certain
amount of sense and even serve to preserve important principles of law.
104. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. AND PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LEGISLATION AND
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 331 (Foundation Press 2000); also SCALIA, supra note 65, at
28. And see, dissenting opinion of Justice Scalia in U.S. v. Williams, 514 U.S. 527, 548
(1995): "If this case involved the interpretation of a statute designed to confer new
benefits or rights upon a class of individuals, today's decision would be more
understandable, since such a statute would be 'entitled to a liberal construction to
accomplish its beneficent purposes.'"
105. ESKRIDGE AND FRICKEY, supra note 97, at 340; see also SCALIA, supra note 65,
at 27, and SUNSTEIN, supra note 65, at 156-57.
106. SUNSTEIN, supra note 65, at 156-157.
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factors, as delineated in Chevron,0 7 Skidmore, 108 and, most
recently, U.S. v. Mead Corporation.10 9 The DOI's interpretation
of NAGPRA may not qualify for the maximum deference due
under Chevron,1 0 but it is certainly entitled to significant
deference, pursuant to Skidmore and Mead."' This rule of
deference to an administering agency's statutory interpretation
is followed by all judges, textualist and contextualist alike.
Contextual Theories of Interpretation
Several different theories of statutory interpretation may be
clustered together under the "contextual" umbrella. All of them
share the notion that a statutory text read in isolation lacks
meaning, and that it is necessary to read a statute in its proper
context in order to make its meaning fully apparent and
comprehensible. "The statute's text is the most important
consideration.., and a clear text ought to be given effect. Yet
the meaning of a text critically depends upon its surrounding
context."" 2 Two major theories that promote the importance of
context in statutory interpretation are Intentionalism and
Purposivism. Both theories advocate interpreting a statute so as
to determine the "will" of Congress and give it full effect. 113
Intentionalists focus on determining the original intent of
the legislature with regard to a particular statute, and on
effectuating that intent. 1 4 This theory is rooted in the notion
107. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
108. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
109. United States v. Mead Corporation, 121 S.Ct. 2164 (2001).
110. This article is not intended to give an opinion as to whether DOI's
interpretation is or is not entitled to "Chevron" deference. A thorough examination of
the level of deference due to DOI's interpretation in this case, and the effect of the Mead
decision, if any, upon that level of deference, is beyond the scope of this article.
111. There is strong language in the Mead decision indicating that Chevron
deference may be due even to an agency determination that is arrived at through less
than formal procedures: "[Als significant as notice- and-comment is in pointing to
Chevron deference, the want of that procedure here does not decide the case, for we have
sometimes found reasons for Chevron deference even when no such administrative
formality was required and none was afforded." U.S. v. Mead Corporation, 121 S.Ct.
2164, 2173 (2001)(citations omitted).
112. ESKRIDGE, THE NEW TEXTUALISM, supra note 81, at 621 (emphasis in original).
113. In a case concerning the interplay between NAGPRA and the Freedom of
Information Act, the federal district court for Hawaii included the following language in
its decision: "When interpreting a statute, the court's objective is to ascertain the intent
of Congress and to give effect to legislative will.'" Na Iwi 0 Na Kupuna 0 Mokapu v.
Dalton, 894 F. Supp. 1397, 1412 (D. Haw. 1995).
114. ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY AND GARRETT, supra note 65, at 214. Early intentionalists
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that legislative intent is of "supreme importance" 115 in statutory
interpretation because it constitutes, in a representative
democracy, the will of the true sovereign, the people. 11 6 In
contrast with textualists, intentionalists attach great
significance to legislative history materials." 7 Such materials
include House and Senate committee reports, special
commission reports or recommendations, transcripts of
congressional hearings, and earlier drafts of a bill. It is from
these materials that evidence of legislative intent is derived. 18
Critics of Intentionalism charge that "legislative intent" is a
mere fiction, because only individual persons are capable of
having intent, and the legislature is comprised of hundreds of
individuals with varying personal intents. 1 9 It is not likely that
all members of Congress would ever have the same intent with
regard to a particular piece of legislation. 120 It can also be safely
assumed, say the critics, that no member of Congress would
have formed any specific intent with regard to "the unique facts
of the case before the court.' 21
It certainly would be impossible to discover the intent of
every member of Congress with regard to a particular statute.
However, evidence of the intent of some members of Congress
can be gleaned from the statute itself, committee reports, and
sponsors' statements. It may not be unreasonable, once that bill
has become law, to project that evident intent onto a majority of
the members of Congress.122 The real flaw of Intentionalism is
engaged in 'imaginative reconstruction," through which they attempted to determine
how the legislators who enacted a statute would decide the case at hand. ESKRIDGE,
DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 13, at 22.
115. EARL T. CRAWFORD, THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES § 159 (1940).
116. ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra
note 104, at 326.
117. ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 13, at 14;
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Justice Breyer: Intentionalist, Pragmatist, and Empiricist, 8
ADMIN. L. J. AM. U. 747, 747 (1995). "Intentionalists attempt to draw interpretive
references from the legislature's stated goals and from a statute's legislative history." Id.
118. See Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in
the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195 (1983).
119. DICKERSON, supra note 65, at 68.
120. Id.
121. LIEF H. CARTER, REASON IN LAW, supra note 79, at 69; see also, John F.
Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 675 (1997).
122. The critics of Intentionalism would disagree with this. For example, see
Scalia, supra note 65, at 32. They argue that the intent of committee members cannot be
imputed to other members of Congress, because bills are approved for a variety of
reasons and not necessarily because individual members ascribe to the intent of the
sponsoring committee. However, Justice Stevens, concurring in Bank One Chicago v.
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that it focuses on original intent, without regard for the current
environment in which the statute operates.
Purposivism focuses on the discernment and effectuation of
the purpose, or underlying goal, of a statute. 123 A statute's
purpose is sometimes made clear by its text. 124  In most
instances, however, purposivists must rely upon legislative
history in order to interpret a statute. 25 As an approach to
statutory construction, purposivism has a long history of use in
the federal courts. 126 When Justice Holmes referred to the "will"
of the legislature, he was really speaking of the "purpose" of a
statute, and Congress's desire to have that that purpose carried
out:
The Legislature has the power to decide what the policy of the law
shall be, and if it has intimated its will, however indirectly, that
will should be recognized and obeyed. The major premise of the
conclusion expressed in a statute, the change of policy that induces
the enactment, may not be set out in terms, but it is not an
adequate discharge of duty to say: We see what you are driving at,
but you have not said it, and therefore we shall go on as before.127
Justice Frankfurter described statutory "purpose" as
follows:
Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264 (1996), opined:
Legislators, like other busy people, often depend upon the judgment of trusted
colleagues when discharging their official responsibilities. If a statute... has
bipartisan support and has been carefully considered by committees familiar
with the subject matter, Representatives and Senators may appropriately rely
on the views of the committee in casting their votes. In such circumstances,
since most Members are content to endorse the views of the responsible
committees, the intent of those involved in the drafting process is properly
regarded as the intent of Congress.
Id. at 276-277.
123. Id.; ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY AND GARRETT, supra note 65, at 213.
124. The words themselves are, "far and away the most reliable source for learning
the purpose of a document." Borella v. Borden Co., 145 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1944).
125. NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, § 45:09 (6th Ed
2001).
126. "[Llegislators, like others concerned with ordinary affairs, do not deal in rigid
symbols,. . . stripped of suggestion .... We can best reach the meaning here, as always,
by recourse to the underlying purpose." Borella, 145 F.2d at 64 supra note 112; Keck v.
United States, 172 U.S. 434, 455 (1899). See also, SUNSTEIN, supra note 51, at 123: "In
cases in which textual and structural approaches are inadequate, a natural and time-
honored response is to resort to the 'purpose' of the statute."
127. Holmes, J., opinion in Johnson v. U.S., 163 F. 30, 32 (1st Cir., 1908), quoted in
POPKIN, supra note 65, at 128.
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Legislation has an aim: it seeks to obviate some mischief, to effect
change of policy... That aim, that policy is not drawn like
nitrogen out of the air; it is evinced in the language of the statute,
as read in the light of the external manifestations of purpose.
That is what the judge must seek and effectuate ... 128
The purpose of a statute may be thought of as the policy
upon which it is based, or which it seeks to promote. For
example, civil rights statutes are based upon the policy favoring
equal treatment under the law for all Americans. The purpose
of civil rights statutes is to promote or implement that policy.
Based on their observation that every statute has a discernible
purpose and that construing a statute with that purpose in mind
will resolve any textual ambiguities, Professors Hart and Sacks
advocated a purposive approach to statutory interpretation. 129
It is arguable that Intentionalism and Purposivism allow for
considerable flexibility in statutory construction, thereby
increasing the risk that judges will in actuality make their own
law or policy rather than implement Congress's law and
policy.' 30 However, it is equally arguable that a textualist
interpretation which ignores all legislative history runs the risk
of defeating the congressional intent and purpose behind that
statute.13'
Why continue to announce that only where the statute is
ambiguous is it subject to construction? Why should the
legislative intent be defeated simply because the statute may seem
clear and unambiguous on its face, when the court could by
applying any of the existing rules of construction, actually
ascertain true legislative intent? 132
128. Frankfurter, supra note 92.
129. ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY AND GARRETr, supra note 65, at 333-334.
130. SCALIA, supra note 65 at 17-18.
131. As Eskridge, Frickey and Garrett put it:
Even if one accepts Justice Scalia's premise that courts are supposed to play a
neutral, nondiscretionary, and perhaps even mechanical role in statutory
policy implementation, it is not clear that his new textualism advances that
goal.
LEGISLATION, supra note 65, at page 238.
132. CRAWFORD, supra note 115, at §175. It should be noted that Crawford did not
use the terms "interpretation" and "construction" as synonyms. According to Crawford,
"interpretation" is the "process of discovering the true meaning of the language" in a
statute, using only text-based sources; and "construction" is the process of using extrinsic
sources to draw conclusions about statutory meaning, legislative intent, and statutory
purpose. Id. at §157. In other words, interpretation is what a textualist does, while
construction is what anyone using legislative history materials and other "context-based"
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Intentionalism is the less attractive of the two theories,
with its focus on original intent and its disregard of legal and
social developments. For that reason, statutory purpose is
preferable to legislative intent as a focal point for the
interpretive process.
"Dynamic" statutory interpretation 133 is the most preferable
method of statutory construction because it is the most
comprehensive. It utilizes a variety of guidelines, legal precepts,
and sources of information in order to construe the meaning of
the statutory text, thereby incorporating the best of the text-
based and context-based theories. Professor Eskridge describes
this dynamic enterprise as follows:
We do not discover the truth of the provision by limiting our vision
to the bare text, or to the original legislative intent, or to current
policy. All of these perspectives work together, and each teaches
us something. 134
Professors Eskridge and Frickey have also described the
dynamic process as one of "practical reasoning,"1 35 which
includes consideration of "a broad range of textual, historical,
and evolutive evidence" and reflects what judges actually do
when they interpret statutes. 136  The dynamic, practical
reasoning form of interpretation includes consideration of the
text, congressional intent, statutory purpose, and the existing
legal and social environment. It also includes recognition of the
fact that the interpreting judge is an integral element of the
interpretational "mix" - that statutory interpretation is a
creative enterprise, and that the judge is a participant in that
enterprise. 137
"Dynamic" or "Comprehensive" Statutory Interpretation
The hard truth of the matter is that American courts have no
sources does.
133. ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 65.
134. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 609, 613 (1990).
135. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 97.
136. Id. at 322 and 359. "Evolutive" evidence includes things like prior
implementation of the statute, current understandings of the Constitution and
fundamental notions of fairness and justice, and relationship between the subject statute
and newer, related statutes or policies. Id. at 359.
137. Id. at 345.
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intelligible, generally accepted, and consistently applied theory of
statutory interpretation. 138
This statement, when made by Professors Hart and Sacks in
1958, was undoubtedly an accurate description of the current
state of affairs in the field of statutory interpretation. And it
was, no doubt, equally accurate and descriptive of then-current
circumstances when Professor Reed Dickerson used it as a
launching point for his book, The Interpretation and Application
of Statutes, in 1975.139 Now, in the year 2002, there remains no
better way to describe the current state of affairs with regard to
statutory interpretation than to borrow the very same words
used by Hart and Sacks forty-four years ago. 140
There are several circumstances that have contributed to
the lack of a single, generally accepted theory of statutory
construction in American jurisprudence and jurispractice. First
of all, theory does not always translate well from the printed
page into practice. We can talk and write interminably (and
indeed, it seems we have 41) about how statutes ought to be
interpreted, but that does not necessarily bring us closer to
accurate interpretation of specific statutes in actual
controversies. 142 Secondly, legal scholars have apparently been
searching for the Holy Grail of interpretation, the one true and
glorious theory that will enable all lawyers and all judges to
correctly construe all statutes in all situations. The Holy Grail
exists only in mythology.
Another circumstance that has prevented the ascension of
one theory of interpretation to a position above all others is the
simple fact that judges are human. As human beings, whether
138. HENRY M. HART, JR., and ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW, 1201 "Tentative Edition" (Harvard
Law School 1958).
139. REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 1
(1975).
140. See, SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 65, at 14 (quoting
HART and SACKS, supra note 138, at 1201). Justice Scalia sees this as a "sad
commentary," and continues: "Even sadder, however, is the fact that the American bar
and American legal education, by and large, are unconcerned with the fact that we have
no intelligible theory." Id. The current state of affairs is not that we lack any intelligible
theory of statutory construction, but that we have so many intelligible theories from
which to choose.
141. See, supra notes 65 and 66.
142. ESKRIDGE, supra note 134, at 322. See also, ROBERT S. SUMMERS, Lon L.
Fuller 122 (1984) (stating "A theory of interpretation cannot decide concrete cases. It
can only specify steps to be taken and structure the exercise of judgment").
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they realize it or not and whether they admit it or not, judges
are influenced in every situation by what they value, what they
believe, and what they understand about the world around
them. 143 In a diverse society, there will always be divergent
views about what is right and good and just.144 A review of the
decisions rendered by the U.S. Supreme Court in the last fifteen
months should convince all doubters that it is indeed impossible
for justices to completely set aside everything that makes them
who they are, even when they make the best of efforts to do so.
Eskridge and Frickey's dynamic interpretation process
takes the judge's personal element and adds it to the mix,
recognizing that interpretation is a creative process. 45 This
dynamic approach is the most inclusive and comprehensive of
the established theories and methods. It allows judges to look to
a wide variety of sources and circumstances for guidance
relating to the meaning of a statute. It takes into account the
will of Congress as well as the text of the statute. It also takes
into account the "will of the people" by placing importance on
developments in the social and legal environment. Eskridge and
Frickey describe the process as the weaving together of various
threads - text, intent, purpose, legislative history, current policy
- into a strong cable that is capable of supporting the end result,
the construed and explicated statute. 46 The greater the number
of factors looked to for statutory meaning, the more the element
of a judge's personal opinions and beliefs is diluted.
The truth of the matter is that comprehensive
interpretation mirrors reality, because judges typically do weave
together various threads of information, text, and precedent to
143. Max Radin reached a similar conclusion more than seventy years ago, when he
noted that the choices a judge must make in the process of interpreting a statute are
influenced, "by those physical elements which make him [or her] the kind of person that
he [or she] is. That this is pure subjectivism and therefore an unfortunate situation is
beyond the point. It is hard to see how subjectivism can be avoided or how the
personality of the judge can be made to count for nothing in his [or her] decision on
statutory interpretation as on everything else." Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43
HARV. L. REV. 863, 881 (1930). See also, ESKRIDGE, supra note 134; Martha Minow,
Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10 (1987); and Kent Greenawalt, Are Mental
States Relevant for Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation? 85 CORNELL L. REV.
1609, 1617-19 (2000).
144. E.g., "We are, quite simply, a diverse society ... The fact cannot be avoided
that the appropriate vision of society, the individual, and the relationship of individuals,
and the appropriate distribution of society's wealth are substantive issues that cannot
help but affect judicial decisions." POPKIN, STATUTES IN COURT, supra note 65, at 195.
145. ESKRIDGE, supra note 134, at 345.
146. Id. at 351.
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arrive at the meaning and import of a statute. Judges who
purport to be concerned mainly with purpose do examine the
words and syntax of a statute. Judges who purport to be
concerned with nothing but the text do look outside the text for
statutory meaning. For example, in Bush v. Gore, in which the
Supreme Court construed a Florida election statute, Justice
Scalia, the champion of New Textualism, stated: "[T]he clearly
expressed intent of the legislature must prevail."1 47
If, in some circumstances, judges do not engage in such a
"weaving" process, it is because there is no need to do so.
Legislative intent, statutory purpose, and textual meaning are
woven inextricably together in a symbiotic relationship from the
inception of the legislative process. Purpose gives rise to intent,
which then augments meaning, which effectuates purpose, and
so forth. Societal values and legal policies change and develop
and affect purpose, intent and even textual meaning, and the
process begins anew.
The process of construing a statute may be regarded as akin
to the threading together of a braided cable, as Eskridge and
Frickey suggest. Or, it may be regarded as akin to the creation
of a stew or ratatouille in which every ingredient complements
the others and in which the flavors mingle and transform and
work together to create the final product. This is the sort of
process that is necessary for honest, reasonable, and accurate
interpretation of a federal statute. It is this sort of dynamic,
comprehensive interpretation that will enable us to discern the
meaning and import of NAGPRA.
COMPREHENSIVE INTERPRETATION OF NAGPRA
A comprehensive construction of NAGPRA requires the use
of relevant canons of construction, and the combination of text-
based and context-based theories of interpretation. This
dynamic, comprehensive approach includes the following:
" Determination of the purpose, or underlying policy goal, of the
statute at issue;
" Examination of the statutory text for meaning, using the
statutory purpose as a guide to meaning;
" Interpretation of the text with the assistance of traditional text-
based and substantive canons of construction, when
147. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (concurring opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist,
joined by Scalia, J. and Justice Thomas) (emphasis added).
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applicable; and
9 Further interpretation of the text in light of the circumstances
that prompted the statute's enactment, the legislative history
of the statute, and the current legal and social environment.
A statute's purpose may be apparent on its face. In some
instances, however, legislative history must be consulted early
on in the interpretation process, for evidence of the statutory
purpose or policy goal. Comprehensive construction, then, is not
a linear process, but is instead a back-and-forth-and-back-again
process of gauging and re-gauging purpose and meaning in order
to arrive at an honest and complete understanding of a statute.
This is the process that should be used to interpret NAGPRA.
This process begins with the legal and social context that gave
rise to the statute.
Social Context
In 1940, legal scholar Felix Cohen wrote with dismay about
the continuation of discriminatory practices against American
Indians. s48 He called for "positive effort to secure appropriate
legislation that will secure to the Indian equal treatment before
the law."149 Decades later, Congress made an effort to meet that
challenge, in connection with the treatment of American Indian
graves and burial artifacts. That effort culminated in the
enactment of NAGPRA by the 101st Congress in 1990.150 This
statute has been hailed as "human rights" legislation,151 and as
the vehicle that has put an end to "academic racism" against
Native American graves and ancestral remains. 152
All states have common law and statutory protections
148. This article uses the term "American Indian" to describe native persons and
tribes. This term was chosen because the law still, for the most part, refers to
indigenous Americans as Indians, and to avoid confusion with references to the term,
"Native American," as it is used in NAGPRA. No disrespect is meant to any native
persons or tribes who would prefer to be called Native American instead of Indian.
149. Felix S. Cohen, Indian Rights and the Federal Courts, 24 MINN. L. REV. 145,
191 (1940).
150. 7 U.S.C. § 4367 (1990).
151. Native American Grave Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990: Senate
Committee Report on S.R. 101-473, 101st Cong. (1990)(Statement of Senator Daniel
Inouye).
152. Walter Echo-Hawk, in argument on behalf of amicus tribes and NAIA,
arguments in Bonnichsen v. U.S. before Judge Jelderks in the federal district court for
the District of Oregon, June 20, 2001 (personal court notes). See also, Jack F. Trope and
Walter R. Echo-Hawk, The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act:
Background and Legislative History, 24 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 35, at pages 36, 59 (1992).
31
Flood: "Kennewick Man" or "Ancient One"? - A Matter of Interpretation
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 2002
MONTANA LAW REVIEW Vol. 63
against the desecration of burial sites and cemeteries. 153 These
laws are not intended to, nor do they, promote certain religious
beliefs, although many persons do have strong religious beliefs
regarding treatment of the deceased. These laws do, however,
recognize a certain sensibility that is common to many persons
of differing beliefs and backgrounds. That sensibility is one of
respect for the remains of deceased human beings. 54 Courts
have traditionally held, however, that this country's laws
protecting burial places do not cover American Indian burial
grounds and human remains.1 55
The differential treatment of native burials has not been
relegated to our distant past. In 1982, a California appellate
court held that a Native American burial ground was not a
"cemetery" within the meaning of the state statute affording
protection to the contents of cemeteries. 56 That decision was
based upon legal precedent, which in turn was based upon
attitudes that prevailed in this country for centuries. The
remains of deceased Indians were never accorded the respect or
care with which society usually treats human remains, and they
were never protected from harm by the common law or state
statutory law. 57 As a result, it became necessary for Congress
to afford them such protection, through federal legislation. 58
153. See also, New York Penal Law § 145.23 (cemetery desecration in first degree is
a felony); Texas Health & Safety Code § 711.0311 (desecration or removal of remains,
and other acts of damage to cemetery, constitutes a felony); Idaho Code § 18-7027
(damage to any marker, crypt or other place of burial is a misdemeanor) and § 18-7028
(removal of remains from place of interment is a felony punishable by fine or
imprisonment or both).
154. Trope and Echo-Hawk, supra, note 152, at 38; Virginia H. Murray, A "Right" of
the Dead and a Charge on the Quick: Criminal Laws Relating to Cemeteries, Burial
Grounds and Human Remains, 56 J. Mo. Bar 115 (Mar./Apr. 2000).
155. Trope & Echo-Hawk, supra, note 152, at 39-42.
156. Wana the Bear v. Community Construction, Inc., 128 Cal.App.3d 536 (1982);
see also Trope and Echo-Hawk, supra note 152, at 46. The failure to treat Indian burial
places as sacred is related, in part, to the fact that non-Indians expect burial places to be
marked with stone monuments and other memorials to the dead. Indian burial grounds
contain no such markers or memorial monuments. It has taken centuries for the rest of
America to understand that, for American Indians, there is no memorial more fitting,
respectful, and beautiful than earth itself.
157. Trope and Echo-Hawk, supra note 152, at 38-48. Scientists have long looted
Indian burial sites for Indian remains and subjected those remains to study, destruction,
or display in museums. The U.S. Surgeon General, by order issued in 1868, directed the
removal of the heads and other body parts of Indian war dead for study at the Army
Medical Museum. Id. See also, THOMAS, SKULL WARS, supra note 7, at 57.
158. Legislation is well suited to furthering the goal of equality. "Clear delineations
of permissible and prohibited forms of conduct contribute significantly to the realization
of equal treatment under the law, which is one of the basic requirements of justice. ... ."
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NAGPRA, in addition to protecting the sanctity of native
burial grounds, mandates that all museums receiving federal
funds shall inventory the native human remains and burial
artifacts in their possession, notify the tribes associated with
those items, and return the items to those tribes. 159 The statute
also requires that Native American remains and burial artifacts
inadvertently discovered on tribal or federal land be repatriated
to the tribe that establishes the closest cultural affiliation with
those remains or items. 160 It is this requirement that has come
into play in Bonnichsen.
Pursuant to NAGPRA, the Corps was required to make the
discovery of the Ancient One known to all tribes with a history
of use or occupation of the land where the discovery was
made.' 6' In accordance with the statute, the tribe that makes a
claim for such remains, and establishes a "cultural affiliation"
with the remains, is entitled to custody and ownership of the
remains. 62 The issues of whether the Ancient One is "Native
American," and whether the claimant tribes have sufficiently
established a "cultural affiliation" with him cannot be resolved
until the statutory terms, "Native American" and "cultural
affiliation," are construed. Before we turn to those terms,
however, we must examine the purpose of the statute and
explore whether the substantive canons of construction govern
the way in which we should interpret this statute.
The Substantive Canons Applied to NAGPRA
The "remedial purpose" canon provides that remedial
legislation should be construed broadly, or liberally, so as to give
full effect to its purpose. 63 This canon of statutory construction
is firmly established in judicial tradition, having been used by
EDGAR BODENHEIMER, POWER, LAW AND SOCIETY: A STUDY OF THE WILL TO POWER AND
THE WILL TO LAW (1972).
159. 25 U.S.C. § 3003 (2001). This is a simplified description of what is in reality a
complex process.
160. 25 U.S.C. § 3002(d) (2001). This requirement put an end to what was
apparently the government's common practice of making such remains available to
scientists who wished to study them, according to a comment made by one of the
plaintiffs during the Bonnichsen court proceedings (personal court notes).
161. Id.
162. 25 U.S.C. § 3002(a) (2001).
163. See, e.g., Primer v. Kuhn, 1 U.S. 452, 453 (1789); Ex Parte McCardle, 73 U.S.
318, 323 (1867); U.S. ex rel Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 557 (1943); Tcherepnin v.
Knight, 389 U.S. 332,336 (1967).
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the Supreme Court since its earliest days. 164 A statute is
remedial if it creates new rights, addresses a social evil or
"mischief," or establishes a remedy for redress of an injury.165
NAGPRA does all three. It establishes in American Indians,
Native Hawaiians and Native Alaskans the right to claim, and
recover ownership of, human remains and cultural patrimony
with which they have some connection. It aims to eradicate the
looting of native burial sites and sale of burial artifacts by
criminalizing such behavior, and it provides a remedy
(repatriation) for the injuries resulting from past occurrences of
such looting and desecration.
The statutory provisions are sufficient in and of themselves
to inform us that NAGPRA is remedial in nature. The statute's
legislative history confirms this conclusion. According to
Senator Daniel Inouye, co-chair of the Senate Select Committee
on Indian Affairs and one of the sponsors of NAGPRA, the
statute's purpose is to put an end to a certain form of racism:
When human remains are displayed in museums or historical
societies, it is never the bones of white soldiers or the first
European settlers that came to this continent that are lying in
glass cases. It is Indian remains. The message that this sends to
the rest of the world is that Indians are ... different from and
inferior to non-Indians. This is racism... [T]he bill before us
today is not about the validity of museums or the value of
scientific inquiry. It is about human rights. 166
Whether regarded as human rights legislation, 167 or simply
as legislation that redresses an old and continuing injury and
aims to prevent its reoccurrence, NAGPRA is undoubtedly a
remedial statute. In accordance with the traditional canon,
therefore, NAGPRA should be construed in such a way as to give
full effect to its remedial purpose. Additional support for this
position comes from the language of the statute itself:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to -
(1) limit the authority of any Federal agency or museum to -
(A) return or repatriate Native American cultural items to
164. 165 Id.
165. SUTHERLAND STAT CONST § 60.2 (6th Ed., Singer, ed.).
166. 136 Cong. Rec. S17174 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990)(statement of Sen. Inouye).
167. Trope and Echo-Hawk, The Native American Graves Protection and
Repatriation Act, supra note 152, at 36.
Vol. 63
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Indian tribes, Native Hawaiian organizations, or individuals,
and
(B) enter into any other agreement with the consent of the
culturally affiliated tribe or organization as to the disposition
of, or control over, items covered by this Act;
(4) limit any procedural or substantive right which may otherwise
be secured to individuals or Indian tribes or Native Hawaiian
organizations; .... 168
The import of this section is that NAGPRA should not in
any event be construed so as to limit or restrict rights native
peoples have in connection with securing custody of ancestral
remains and cultural articles. This is a clear directive from
Congress that NAGPRA is to be construed liberally, and that the
rights of Native Americans and the underlying purpose of the
statute should guide that construction. When Congress has
made its desires known, the courts must abide by them. 169
The "Indian law" canon of statutory construction, which is
also firmly established in judicial tradition, requires that Indian
legislation be construed in favor of Indian interests. 170 This
canon was first utilized in the interpretation of treaties between
tribes and the federal government. However, courts have long
applied the canon to statutes as well, construing Indian-related
statutes liberally, so as to resolve ambiguities in favor of Indian
rights.171 NAGPRA confers on Indian tribes and individuals a
new right, and it provides mechanisms for the protection of this
right. That makes it Indian legislation. 72 Any reasonable doubt
of that should be put to rest by the final section of the statute:
This Act reflects the unique relationship between the Federal
Government and Indian tribes and Native Hawaiian organizations
and should not be construed to establish a precedent with respect
168. 25 U.S.C. § 3009 (2001).
169. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REvOLUTION, supra note 65, at 133-34.
See also, BENJAMIN N. CARDOzO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW, 94 (1924).
170. See, e.g., Choctaw Nation v. U.S., 119 U.S. 1, 28 (1886); Choctaw Nation v.
Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 631 (1970); County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of New
York, 470 U.S. 226, 247 (1985).
171. ScALiA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 65, at 27. In connection
with statutes (as opposed to treaties), the Indian law canon is really just a specialized
version of the remedial purpose canon.
172. Counsel to the Bonnichsen plaintiffs argued in court that NAGPRA is not
Indian legislation (personal court notes).
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to any other individual, organization or foreign government. 173
Pursuant to the traditional canon, therefore, NAGPRA must
be construed in favor of the Indian rights or interests at stake.
The primary Indian interest protected by NAGPRA, and at issue
in Bonnichsen, is the right to bury one's dead in accordance with
cultural traditions and to expect their burial places to remain
undisturbed. The statute carves out no exception for human
remains or cultural articles of great antiquity. In fact, the
requirement that cultural affiliation be established
"prehistorically" indicates that ancient remains are intentionally
within the scope of the coverage afforded by NAGPRA. 174
Therefore, even remains as ancient as the Ancient One may well
be subject to NAGPRA, if they otherwise meet the definition of
"Native American." Any interpretation of the statute that would
exempt ancient remains from its reach would be detrimental to
the Indian interest at stake, and contrary to the established
Indian law canon of construction.
The Meaning of "Native American"
§3001(9). Native American means of, or relating to, a tribe, people,
or culture that is indigenous to the United States.
It is clear from the language of the statute that it applies
only to "Native American" remains and artifacts: "The
ownership or control of Native American cultural items ... shall
be .... ,,175 It is also clear that "Native American," in NAGPRA,
is not a synonym for "American Indian," as it is in common
usage. This is apparent from a reading of the definition in
relation to the statute as a whole. Elsewhere in NAGPRA, the
words Indian and Indian tribe are used. Congress could have
used these terms in its definition of Native American, but it did
not. Therefore, Congress did not intend Native American to be
understood as a synonym for American Indian in this particular
statute.
In order to understand the statutory term Native American,
then, we must make certain that we understand the meaning of
the words used to define that term. We must determine what
"indigenous," "tribe," "people" and "culture" mean, as used in the
173. 25 U.S.C. § 3010 (2001).
174. 25 U.S.C. § 3001(9) (2001).
175. 25 U.S.C. § 3002(a) (2001)(emphasis supplied).
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statute. These are familiar words, but they are words that have
multiple meanings. When a word or phrase is capable of being
understood in more than one way, it is said to be ambiguous,
and it requires further clarification. 176 The statutory definition
of "Native American" is intended to help us interpret the
statute, but we cannot do that properly until we interpret the
definition itself.
The component words of the definition of Native American
are not separately defined. The word "indigenous" commonly
means native to a particular place. 177 Dictionary definitions are
not evidence, and cannot be given conclusive effect in connection
with statutory meaning, but they can provide useful guidance.
178
Indigenous is defined in two standard dictionaries as
follows:
Indigenous: 1. Originating in and characterizing a particular
region or country; native... 2. Innate; inherent; natural .... Syn.
1. Autochthonous, aboriginal, natural. 179
Indigenous: 1. Born or produced naturally in a land or region;
native or belonging naturally to (the soil, region, etc.). (Used
primarily of aboriginal or natural products.) 180
Since the word "aboriginal" is used in these definitions of
indigenous, it may be helpful to have the precise meaning of
that word as well. Random House defines aboriginal as: "1. Of,
pertaining to, or typical of aborignies.... 2. original or earliest
known; native; indigenous. "s181 The Oxford English Dictionary
offers the following:
Aboriginal: 1. First or earliest so far as history or science gives
record; primitive; strictly native, indigenous. Used both of the
races and natural features of various lands. 2. Dwelling in any
176. See, e.g., POPKIN, supra note 65, at 187; Donna D. Adler, A Conversational
Approach to Statutory Analysis: Say What You Mean and Mean What You Say, 66 MISS.
L. J. 37, 37 (1996); SUTHERLAND STAT CONST § 45.2 (6th Ed., Singer, ed.).
177. Judge Jelderks commented during the court arguments that indigenous is a
word that might seem simple, "but isn't really quite that simple." Personal court notes,
June 19, 2001.
178. MCI Telecommunications v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218, 240, 114 S.Ct. 2223, 2236
(1994)(Justice Stevens, dissenting opinion).
179. RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 973 (2nd ed. 1993).
180. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 867 (2ND ED 1989).
181. RANDOM HOUSE, supra note 180. "Aborigine" is defined as: "one of the original
or earliest inhabitants of a country or region." Id.
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country before the arrival of later (European) colonists. 182
It is possible, using these definitions that clarify the
meaning of "indigenous," to construct a more detailed definition
of the statutory term, "Native American":
"Native American" means of, or relating to, a tribe, people, or
culture that originated in or dwelled in the United States
before the arrival of European colonists. 183
It is not possible to reach a full understanding of the term
"Native American", until the statutory meaning of the words,
"tribe," "people," and "culture" is determined. "Tribe" has many
meanings, but those most germane to this discussion appear to
be the following:
Tribe: 1. Any aggregate of people united by ties of descent from a
common ancestor, community of customs and traditions,
adherence to the same leaders, etc. 2. A local division of an
aboriginal people. 184
Tribe: L.a. A group of persons forming a community and claiming
descent from a common ancestor;... b. A particular race of
recognized ancestry; a family.... 3. A race of people; frequently
applied to a group of primitive people.185
The word "people" may need no explanation, but since it,
too, has various meanings, the following dictionary definitions
may be helpful:
People: 4. the entire body of persons who constitute a community,
tribe, race, nation, or other group by virtue of a common culture,
history, religion, or the like .... 186
People: 1. A body of persons composing a community, tribe, race,
or nation. 2.a. The persons belonging to a place, or constituting a
182. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 35 (2ND ED 1989).
183. The use of the word "indigenous" to refer to people who populated a region
before Europeans colonized it is consistent with its use in international law, according to
a statement made in court by Walter Echo-Hawk, co-counsel for the National Congress of
American Indians. (Personal court notes).
184. RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 2018 (2ND ED. 1993).
185. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 503 (2ND ED. 1989).
186. RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1436 (2ND ED 1993).
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tribe, people or culture. This language does not appear to
mandate that human remains must be "of or relating to" a
modern Indian tribe. On the contrary, the use of the term
"indigenous" is an indication that the remains are required only
to have some connection to a tribe or people that lived in this
country before European colonization. "Relating to" could be
construed as "related to," as in "akin to" or "of the same family,"
but that does not appear to be its meaning in this section of the
statute. Other sections of NAGPRA refer specifically to "lineal
descendants," a very clear reference to family relationship. It
may reasonably be concluded, therefore, from the context of this
section within the statute as a whole, that "relating to" in the
definition of "Native American" has a broader meaning than
relation by blood or family ties.
What, then, does "relating to" mean? In common usage,
"relating to" is used interchangeably with the phrases, "in
connection with" and "in relation to." According to Webster, "in
relation to" means: "concerning; regarding; with reference to."191
The word "relate" means, among other things, "to connect or
associate, as in thought or meaning;"1 92 or "to have reference
(often followed by to)." 93 It appears, then, that "of, or relating
to" in Section 3001(9) of NAGPRA means: "belonging to or being
a member of, or having some connection or association with."
Accordingly, the statutory term "Native American", as applied to
human remains, and as enriched and clarified by the definitions
of the words comprising that term, may be expressed as follows:
"Native American" means belonging to or being a member of, or
having some connection or association with, a tribe/clan/
community/people/group of persons connected by culture, that
originated in or dwelled in the United States prior to the arrival of
European colonists.
The DOI has defined Native American, in the regulations
implementing NAGPRA, as follows: "The term Native American
means of, or relating to, a tribe, people or culture indigenous to
the United States, including Alaska and Hawaii." 94  This
definition mirrors the statutory language, and is congruent with
191. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE, UNABRIDGED (1971).
192. Id.
193. RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY, supra note 180.
194. 43 C.F.R. § 10.2(d) (2001).
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particular... company or class.... 3.c. Those to whom any one
belongs; the members of one's tribe, clan, family, community...
etc., collectively.18 7
To complete the triad, "culture" is defined as:
Culture: 5.b. A particular form or type of intellectual
development. Also, the civilization, customs, artistic
achievements, etc., of a people, especially at a certain stage of its
development or history. 188
Culture: 3. a particular form or stage of civilization, as that of a
certain nation or period. 4. the sum total of ways of living built up
by a group of human beings and transmitted from one generation
to another.
189
The definitions set forth above indicate that the words,
"tribe" and "people," are synonyms. Both terms refer to groups
of persons who have some connection with each other. That
connection may be based on geography, religion, family
relationship, or some other factor. "Culture" refers to the
characteristics and accomplishments of a group of people, such
as belief systems and practices, social customs, and artistic
creations. The traditional canon of construction, noscitur a
sociis,190 suggests that "culture" should be interpreted in relation
to the words with which it is listed. The application of noscitur a
sociis turns "culture" into a synonym for "tribe" and "people,"
and its meaning thus becomes "a group of persons known for
their particular culture." Based on these three terms, as fully
explicated, the statutory term, "Native American," can be
expressed as follows:
Native American means of, or relating to, a tribe/clan!
community/people/group of persons connected by culture that
originated in or dwelled in the United States prior to the arrival of
European colonists.
There is one more portion of this statutory definition that
must be clarified, and that is the requirement that Native
American human remains be "of, or relating to" an indigenous
187. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 504, 505 (2ND ED. 1989).
188. Id. at 121.
189. RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY, supra note 180.
190. Discussed supra.
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the statutory definition. 195
DOI has explained its interpretation of this term as follows:
[WIe consider that the term 'Native American' is clearly intended
by NAGPRA to encompass all tribes, peoples, and cultures that
were residents of the lands comprising the United States prior to
historically-documented European exploration of these lands. 196
This interpretation corresponds with the dictionary
definitions consulted herein and with the detailed explanation of
the term "Native American" developed through examination of
the statutory text and those dictionary definitions. The DOI's
interpretation of "Native American" is, therefore, consistent
with the construction of the statutory term derived through
examination of the text as clarified by dictionaries and
traditional syntactical canons. In other words, using nothing
more than the theory of Textualism, it is possible to arrive at a
meaning of "Native American" that is clear and comprehensible,
and that correlates with the meaning DOI has assigned to that
term.
Even when a court concludes that the meaning of a
statutory provision is clear, it may look to legislative history to
confirm its conclusion. 197 In this case, the meaning of "Native
American" as explicated in the foregoing discussion is confirmed
by a review of NAGPRA's legislative history. H.R. 5237, the bill
that became NAGPRA, contained the definition of Native
American that now appears in the statute. Every precursor bill,
however, in the Senate and the House, contained a narrower
definition of that term. For example, the earliest of these
precursors, S. 187, contained the following definition:
195. Plaintiffs in Bonnichsen argue otherwise (personal court notes). They argue
that a difference in meaning is created because the statute reads, ". . . of, or relating to, a
tribe, people, or culture that is indigenous to..." (emphasis added), while the regulation
reads, ". . . of, or relating to, a tribe, people or culture indigenous to. . . ." Plaintiffs
contend that the words "that is" in the statute indicate a requirement that human
remains be related to an existing Indian tribe, and that the DOI has attempted to
remove that requirement by removing those two words from its definition of Native
American. Id. This is an untenable position. The words "that is" are not essential to the
meaning of the definition; it means the same thing whether they are included or not.
196. Letter of Francis P. McManamon, Departmental Consulting Archaeologist, to
Lt. Col. Donald Curtis, Jr., U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, dated Dec. 23, 1997; available
at http://www.cr.nps.gov/aad/nagpra/kennew.htm and referenced there as "Letter to
USACOE on Kennewick Man."
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The term 'Native American' means any individual who is -
(4) an Indian, or
(5) a Native Hawaiian, or
(6) an Alaskan Native, including Aleuts and Inuits.198
S. 102.1, introduced by Senator McCain, contained a
definition of "Native American" that was virtually identical to
that contained in S. 187. S. 1980, introduced by Senator Inouye,
and based largely upon the language in the National Museum of
the American Indian Act, 199 was the first to broaden the
definition of Native American. It defines 'Native American' as
"an individual of a tribe people or culture that is indigenous to
the Americas and such term includes a Native Hawaiian."200
The House also had two bills that preceded its final one on
the protection of native graves and repatriation of cultural
patrimony. In March of 1989, Representative Charles Bennett
introduced H.R. 1381, and Representative Morris Udall
introduced H.R. 1646. Both bills defined "Native American" in a
way that mirrors those definitions in S. 187 and S. 1021 by
simple reference to Indians, Native Hawaiians, and Native
Alaskans. H.R. 5237, which replaced S. 1980 and was enacted
into law, contained from the time of its introduction the
definition of "Native American" that is now in the statute. 201
This indicates that Congress fully intended the term "Native
American" to have a broader meaning than the earlier bills
would have given it, and that this explicated version of the
statutory term reflects that Congressional intent.
It is still necessary to determine whether the Ancient One
fits the definition of Native American. He lived on land now a
part of the United States, long before European settlers arrived.
198. 199 Natie Amnerican Musecum Claims Commission Act, Senate Hearing 100-931 on S. 187, Senate Select Committee on Indian
Aflr, 100th Congress, July 29, 1988.
199. National Museum of the American Indian Act, Pub. L. No. 101-185 (codified as
20 U.S.C. 80q, et. seq.) (1989)(creating a new Museum of the American Indian as a part
of the Smithsonian Institution. It also requires the Smithsonian to inventory all its
native human remains and sacred artifacts, and to repatriate them to the appropriate
tribes in accordance with the statute and with regulations promulgated by the Secretary
of the Interior).
200. Senate Hearing 101-952, on S. 1021 and S. 1980, Senate Select Committee on
Indian Affairs, 101st Congress, May 14, 1990 (quoting S. 1980 section 16).
201. Robert W. Lannan, Anthropology and Restless Spirits: The Native American
Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, and the Unresolved Issues of Prehistoric Human
Remains, 22 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 369, 415-416 (1998).
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For this reason, he can be described as native or indigenous to
the continent. He survived life-threatening injuries suffered
years before his death - the embedding of a stone spearhead in
his hipbone, and the crushing of two ribs. For that reason, it is
reasonable to conclude that he belonged to some tribe or group of
people, because he could not have survived those injuries on his
own.20 2 The "culture" that the Ancient One is identified with can
be referred to as that of the people of the Windust Plateau in the
Late Holocene period of history.203 It is possible, then, to
identify the Ancient One in the way that remains must be
identified in order to be deemed "Native American." Therefore,
the Ancient One is Native American within the meaning of
NAGPRA.
The Meaning of "Cultural Affiliation"
§3001(2). "Cultural affiliation" means that there is a relationship
of shared group identity which can be reasonably traced
historically or prehistorically between a present day Indian tribe
or Native Hawaiian organization and an identifiable earlier group.
NAGPRA mandates that ownership of inadvertently
discovered Native American remains shall be in the lineal
descendants, or in the tribe on whose tribal (reservation) lands
the remains were found, or in the tribe with the closest cultural
affiliation. 204  In addition, if cultural affiliation cannot be
"reasonably ascertained," then ownership vests in the tribe that
has been recognized, in a "final judgment" of the Indian Claims
Commission or the U.S. Court of Claims, as the aboriginal
occupant of the land on which the remains were found.20 5 In any
event, it is incumbent upon the interested tribe or lineal
descendants to submit a claim pursuant to NAGPRA.
In order to establish a "cultural affiliation" with claimed
remains, a tribe must, in accordance with the definition of that
term, show a "relationship of shared group identity" between
itself and the "earlier identifiable group" with which the remains
are associated. The statute does not specify just how close or
strong a relationship that must be. The use of the word
202. Powell and Rose, Report on the Osteological Assessment of the 'Kennewick Man'
Skeleton, supra note 46.
203. Id.
204. 25 U.S.C. § 3002(a) and §3002(d) (2001).
205. 25 U.S.C. § 3002(a)(2)(C)(1) (2001).
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"prehistorically" in the definition of "cultural affiliation" further
obscures the issue of proof. Prehistory is, to a large extent, a
great unknown. How close a relationship or connection could
possibly be traced "prehistorically"? And just what is a "shared
group identity"?
It is advisable, in connection with the comprehensive
interpretation of NAGPRA, to use dictionary definitions as an
aid to discerning the meaning of cultural affiliation. First,
however, it should be recalled that NAGPRA is a remedial
statute aimed at redressing past injustice and preventing its
future reoccurrence. It is a statute that has as its purpose the
eradication of "academic racism" 20 6 and blatant disregard for the
sensibilities of native peoples with regard to their deceased
ancestors and burial grounds. It is a statute that must be
construed honestly and reasonably in light of this remedial
purpose and the Indian interests it protects.
The term "shared group identity," as a component of
"cultural affiliation," requires clarification. The word "shared"
presents no problem: it means, in common understanding and
usage, something owned or enjoyed by more than one person. In
the definition of cultural affiliation, it clearly means something
attributable to, or associated with, both the claimant tribe and
the "earlier identifiable group." In order to understand "shared
group identity," however, we need to determine just what the
statute means by "group" and "identity." Starting with the word
"group" will facilitate explication of both phrases in which the
word appears - that is, it will lead to an understanding of both
"shared group identity" and "identifiable earlier group."
The word "group" generally means two or more things or
persons. It also, however, has numerous more specific
meanings. The dictionaries inform us that "group" means,
among other things:
Group: (noun) 1. any collection or assemblage of persons or
things; cluster; aggregation. 2. a number of persons or things
ranged or considered together as being related in some way. 3.
Ethnol. A unit of social organization less complex than a band. 207
206. Term used by Walter Echo-Hawk, co-counsel for the National American Indian
Association, during arguments in federal district court on June 20, 2001 (personal court
notes). See also, SKULL WARS, supra note 7, Chapter 4: 'A Short History of Scientific
Racism in America."
207. RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY (1966). [Emphasis supplied.)
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Relationship: 3: an aspect or quality (as resemblance, direction,
difference) that can be predicated only of two or more things taken
together: something perceived or discovered by observing or
thinking about two or more things at the same time: CONNECTION.
215
Finally, then, the definition of "cultural affiliation" may be
fully explicated, as follows:
"Cultural affiliation" means that there is some identifying trait,
custom, characteristic or other identifying feature that the
claimant tribe and the earlier band or group of persons have in
common with one another; and that this common identifying
feature creates a connection between the modem tribe and the
earlier group, which can be traced historically or prehistorically.
This statutory term, as construed, must now be applied to
the Ancient One. Was he a member of an "earlier group"? The
evidence indicates that he was. He had a stone spearhead
embedded in his hipbone when he was a young man, yet he
survived, and the bone shows no trace of infection. 216 This
indicates that he had others to help him with this injury, and
that they knew something about healing wounds and preventing
infection. He also suffered an injury resulting in crushed ribs
some years prior to his death. 217  This, too, was a life-
threatening injury that he could not have survived without
assistance.218 Finally, two separate reports concluded that,
based on the condition of the remains and other relevant factors,
the Ancient One had been interred after death. The persons who
buried him likely had some relationship with him or they would
not have made the effort to bury him, and they must have
believed that burial was the appropriate treatment for the
remains of a deceased person. On the basis of this evidence, it
would not be unreasonable to conclude that the Ancient One was
a member of a group.
It is now necessary to determine the level of proof applicable
to the element of cultural affiliation under NAGPRA. The
statute does not specify a standard of proof for cultural
affiliation, but it does suggest that a preponderance of the
215. Random House Dictionary, supra note 208.
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evidence might be appropriate. 219 The Secretary of the Interior
found that the claimant tribes had established cultural
affiliation by a preponderance of the evidence. 220 The brief DOI
submitted in Bonnichsen avers that the Secretary's finding of
cultural affiliation is reasonable because it is based on a
preponderance of the evidence. 221 The statute itself, however,
does not require this level of proof.
When a tribe submits a claim for remains, and those
remains are determined to be Native American within the
meaning of NAGPRA, any reasonable proof of cultural affiliation
should be sufficient for approval of that claim. It is only when
there are two or more competing claims that NAGPRA requires
a claimant tribe to establish, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that it has the closest, or strongest, cultural affiliation
with the claimed items.222 This is the only mention of any
standard of proof that appears in the statutory language
governing ownership of inadvertently discovered remains and
artifacts .223
Admittedly, it would be rare for a statute to require proof in
an amount less than a preponderance of the evidence. However,
NAGPRA is not a typical statute. It is remedial in nature, it is
Indian legislation, and it embodies an apology for injuries
inflicted upon native peoples not only with the acquiescence of
the government but pursuant to government order.224 NAGPRA
is, in essence, a revolution on paper. And revolutions require
extraordinary measures. The plain language of the statute
appears to require no more than a scintilla of evidence showing
a cultural connection between a claimant tribe and the remains
or artifacts claimed, except that greater proof is required when
necessary to resolve competing tribal claims. Therefore, in the
absence of competing tribal claims, the statute does not require
that proof of cultural affiliation rise to the level of a
preponderance of the evidence.
The legislative history supports this reading of the statute.
The Senate Report on S. 1980, which was subsequently replaced
219. See discussion in Bacground Section, supra.
220. Babbitt letter, supra note 47.
221. Defendants' Memorandum, supra note 43,at 11.
222. 25 U.S.C. § 3002(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C)(2) (2001).
223. 25 U.S.C. § 3002 (2001).
224. HURST THOMAS, SKULL WARS, supra, note 7, at 57. See also, Trope and Echo-
Hawk, supra note 152; In the 1860's, the Surgeon General ordered all field officers to
collect Indian crania and skeletons and send them to the Army Medical Museum.
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by H.R. 5237, mentions that proof of cultural affiliation should
be "by a simple preponderance of the evidence," but that
discussion of proof is limited to claims for human remains and
cultural articles in the collections of museums or federal
agencies. 225 The House Report on H.R. 5237, the bill that
became NAGPRA, includes the following discussion concerning
proof of cultural affiliation in connection with ancient remains:
Where human remains and associated fimerary objects are
concerned, the committee is aware that it may be too difficult, in
many instances, to trace an item from modern Indian tribes to
prehistoric remains without some reasonable gaps in the historic
or prehistoric record. In such instances, a finding of cultural
affiliation should be based upon an overall evaluation of the
totality of circumstances and evidence... and should not be
precluded solely because of some gaps in the record. 226
All that is lacking in the proof submitted with regard to the
Ancient One is a continuous connection from the claimant tribes
all the way back to the Ancient One's lifetime 9,500 years ago.
Even if cultural affiliation must be established by a
preponderance of the evidence, the gap in time is not sufficient
reason to preclude a finding of cultural affiliation. The evidence
suggesting cultural affiliation includes geographical location, 227
oral histories of the claimant tribes that they have resided in
that area of Washington State for all time, and the lack of any
"migration stories" in the oral histories of these tribes.228
Another piece of evidence indicating a cultural affiliation
between the tribes and the Ancient One is the conclusion,
reached by two separate teams of scientists, that the Ancient
One was purposefully interred after death. This indicates a
belief held by the "earlier group" that burial was appropriate for
deceased persons, which corresponds with the belief held by the
claimant tribes. All of this information, considered together, is
sufficient to establish a nexus between the claimant tribes and
the Ancient One.
225. Senate Report on S.101-473, supra note 152.
226. House Report 101-877, Oct. 15, 1990, to accompany H.R. 5237.
227. The findings of fact in the settlement of the ICC actions provided this evidence,
along with other historical evidence of the occupancy of this area by the Umatilla and
other tribes and bands of American Indians.
228. Babbitt letter, supra note 47; also Defendants' Memorandum, supra note 22.
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ADDITIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE TRIBES' CLAIM
TO THE ANCIENT ONE
The 1855 treaty between the U.S. and the Confederated
Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation provides additional
support for the government's decision to repatriate the Ancient
One to the tribes. The Umatilla have an unqualified right to
ownership and possession of the Ancient One pursuant to that
treaty, by which they sold their tribal lands, including the land
on which the Ancient One was discovered, to the U.S.
government. Federal courts have frequently held that a tribe
may retain certain rights, powers and interests not expressly
granted or relinquished by it in a treaty.229 The Umatilla did not
intend to relinquish their rights as kin or caretakers of any
human remains buried beneath the lands conveyed in the 1855
treaty. Therefore, they retained such rights and those rights
remain in effect to this day.
In accordance with the Indian law canon of construction,
treaties must be construed in favor of Indian interests. The
interest at stake here is the cultural tradition of honoring
deceased ancestors and protecting their remains from
disturbance. The tribes and bands of Indians whose lands were
transferred to the U.S. through that 1855 treaty, now known
collectively as the Umatilla, would never have relinquished their
rights to protect the remains of their ancestors. They would
never have agreed that, by selling their land, they were also
selling the bones of all deceased persons buried in that land.
They held those bones sacred, and believed that they should be
allowed to rest in the earth for all time.
This belief is expressed in the statement of Armand
Minthorn, a member of the Umatilla Board of Trustees, in
connection with the Ancient One:
My tribe has ties to this individual because he was uncovered in
our traditional homeland - a homeland where we still retain
fishing, hunting, gathering, and other rights under our 1855
treaty with the U.S. Government....
229. U.S. v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 25 S.Ct. 662, 49 L.Ed. 1089 (1905); see also Trope
and Echo-Hawk, supra note 152.
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Group: (adj.)l: of or relating to a group: belonging to or shared by
the members of a group as a whole: COLLECTIVE. 208
The use of the word "band" is worth noting, because it is
particularly relevant to the subject matter of NAGPRA and to
the tribes that have claimed the Ancient One. The parties to the
1855 treaty with the U.S., by which the U.S. purchased the land
on which the Ancient One was discovered, were the "Walla-
Wallas, Cayuses, and Umatilla tribes, and bands of Indians. 20 9
For this reason, it makes sense to examine the definition of
"band" also, because it may help us to understand the statutory
meaning of "group."210 The pertinent definitions of this word are
as follows:
Band: 4. a division of a nomadic tribe; a group of individuals who
move and camp together. 211
Band: 3.a. a group of persons, animals or things: as b: a body of
persons often brought together by a common purpose or bound
together by a common fate or lot; specif a relatively self-sufficient
tribal subgroup that is mainly united for social and economic
reasons. 212
"Identity" is not the simplest of concepts, because it is the
essence of what makes a person herself, and not someone else.213
Personal identity may include hair color, intelligence, religious
affiliation, ancestry, education, height and weight, and more.
None of these attributes, other than height and weight, could
ever be established in connection with prehistoric, North
American remains.
It is necessary to focus on the sorts of qualities or
information that might identify several persons as a unified
group, because NAGPRA refers to "group" identity. Traits of
208. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY (1971).
209. Treaty with the WallaWalla (1855), 12 Stat. 945, supra note 18.
210. The meaning of "band" may inform the meaning of "group," in the same way
that the meaning of "aboriginal" informs the meaning of "indigenous" in the statutory
definition of "Native American."
211. RANDOM HOUSE, supra note 208.
212. ENTRY 3 FOR WORD "BAND," WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY, supra note 209.
213. "Identity: 2. the condition of being oneself or itself, and not another. 3.
Condition or character as to who a person or what a thing is." RANDOM HOUSE
DICTIONARY, supra note 208.
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group identity could include geographic location, cultural rites
and customs, diet, artworks, physical characteristics, language,
tools, and accoutrements such as baskets and cooking vessels.
The ancient Greeks, for example, are known for their temples,
sculpture and literature. Individual American Indian tribes
may be identified in connection with their traditional customs,
artwork, oral histories, and geographic location (for example, the
"Plains Indians" or "Indians of the Northern Rockies"). None of
these attributes identifies everything of importance about a
group, but each provides an element of the group's identity.
With this in mind, a comprehensible explanation of the term
"shared group identity" may be crafted, as follows:
"Shared group identity" means some identifying feature that is
common to both groups, such as physical characteristics, cultural
practices, geographical location, or other identifying feature.
The term "earlier identifiable group" must also be explicated
in connection with the construction of "cultural affiliation." The
word "earlier" is easy enough: it just refers to a group that
existed earlier in time than the modern day. The word "group"
has already been examined. It refers to a gathering of
individuals bound together by something they have in common.
Group may also refer to a tribal sub-group, or a group smaller in
size. than a band (which is smaller than a tribe), which lives and
travels together. The word "identifiable" is likely meant to refer
back to "shared group identity"; therefore, it requires that the
earlier group have some distinguishing or identifying feature
with which it may be associated. It does not mean that the
group must have a name that science has bestowed upon it,214
nor does it require that there be a large collection of tools or
textiles or other goods by which the group can be identified.
The meaning of the word "relationship" is the final element
necessary for a complete understanding of "cultural affiliation."
In ordinary understanding, "relationship" means a connection
between two people or two things. The dictionary definition
confirms that understanding of the word:
214. During the arguments on June 19 and 20, Judge Jelderks often came back to
the question, "Who is this earlier group? What are they called?" This is a natural
question to ask, because we all tend to want names for things as a way of understanding
and classifying them. The statute does not require, however, that a name exist for the
earlier group mentioned in the definition of cultural affiliation.
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Our religious beliefs, culture, and adopted policies and procedures
tell us that this individual must be re-buried as soon as possible.
Our elders have taught us that once a body goes into the ground, it
is meant to stay there until the end of time. 230
The Umatillas' treaty with the federal government must be
construed in light of these beliefs and the understandings the
tribes would have had at the time the treaty was signed.
Pursuant to such a construction of the 1855 treaty, the Umatilla
have the right to take custody of the Ancient One's remains and
return them to the earth.
This position is strengthened by the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Idaho v. United States, in which the Court held that
the Coeur d'Alene Tribe retained title to lands submerged under
Lake Coeur d'Alene and the St. Joe River.231 That decision rests,
in large part, upon evidence indicating that the Coeur d'Alene
tribe viewed the lake and river as vitally important to them at
the time they were negotiating their treaty with the federal
government. Justice Souter, writing for the majority, noted:
"The intent [of Congress], in other words, was that anything not
consensually ceded by the Tribe would remain for the Tribe's
benefit ... .,"232 Similarly, in the case of the 1855 treaty between
the Umatilla and the federal government, anything not ceded by
the Umatilla was retained by and reserved in them. One of the
rights retained by and reserved in the Umatilla is the right to
recover possession of any human remains buried in their tribal
lands before those lands were transferred to the U.S. pursuant
to the 1855 treaty.
CONCLUSION
NAGPRA must be construed in light of its remedial
purpose, in accordance with its statutory definitions of Native
American and cultural affiliation, and in the context of its
legislative and social history. The use of a comprehensive or
"dynamic" approach to interpretation, including a focus on
statutory purpose as a guide to meaning, makes possible an
honest, complete, and accurate interpretation of the statute.
Such comprehensive construction is necessary in order to
determine the meaning and scope of the statute, to give full
230. Armand Minthorn, Human Remains Should be Reburied, supra note 11.
231. Idaho v. United States, 121 S.Ct. 2135 (2001).
232. Id. at 2145.
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effect to the statute's remedial purpose and full benefit to the
Indian interest at stake, and to give full effect to the will of
Congress. In the words of Justice Benjamin Cardozo:
When the legislature has spoken, and declared one interest
superior to another, the judge must subordinate his [or her]
personal or subjective estimate of value to the estimate thus
declared. 233
The legislature has spoken: it has declared that the
interests of American Indians, Native Alaskans, and Native
Hawaiians in the remains of their deceased ancestors, no matter
how ancient, are superior to any interests that scientists might
have in those remains. The Ancient One is "Native American"
as defined by the statute, and the claimant tribes have
established a cultural affiliation with him as required by the
statute. Accordingly, the Ancient One must be repatriated,
without further delay, to the tribes that have claimed him as
their own.
233. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW, 94 (1924).
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